The Strategy of Experts for Repeated Predictions

We investigate the behavior of experts who seek to make predictions with maximum impact on an audience. At a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. A public prediction gradually converges to the outcome, and an expert has access to a more accurate prediction. We study when the expert should reveal his information, when his reward is based on a proper scoring rule (e.g., is proportional to the change in log-likelihood of the outcome). In Azar et. al. (2016), we analyzed the case where the expert may make a single prediction. In this paper, we analyze the case where the expert is allowed to revise previous predictions. This leads to a rather different set of dilemmas for the strategic expert. We find that it is optimal for the expert to always tell the truth, and to make a new prediction whenever he has a new signal. We characterize the expert's expectation for his total reward, and show asymptotic limits