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Weighted Committee Games

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arxiv 1712.03114 v2 pith:AUQRC45S submitted 2017-12-08 math.CO cs.GT

Sascha Kurz , Alexander Mayer , Stefan Napel This is my paper · ORCID
classification math.COcs.GT
keywords gamesweightedbordacommitteecopelanddecisionsnumberplurality
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Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of different voting weights (share-holdings, party seats, etc.) under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The number and geometry of weight equivalence classes differ widely across the rules. Decisions can be much more sensitive to weights in Borda committees than (anti-)plurality or Copeland ones.

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