pith. sign in

arxiv: 2308.01036 · v4 · submitted 2023-08-02 · 🪐 quant-ph

Performance Analysis of Satellite-Based QKD Protocols

Pith reviewed 2026-05-24 07:16 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🪐 quant-ph
keywords satellite QKDquantum key distributionBB84 protocolB92 protocolBBM92 protocolE91 protocolQBERuplink downlink
0
0 comments X

The pith

Downlink LEO satellite links achieve lower QBER and higher secure key rates than uplinks for BB84, B92, BBM92, and E91.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper models QBER and secure key rates for four QKD protocols over LEO satellite links in uplink and downlink directions. It applies a Gaussian beam model that accounts for diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise under day and night conditions while varying zenith angle. The central result is that downlinks outperform uplinks overall, BB84 beats B92 in prepare-and-measure schemes, and BBM92 beats E91 in entanglement-based schemes.

Core claim

Downlink links generally exhibit lower QBER and higher secure key rates than uplinks, and among prepare-and-measure schemes, BB84 consistently outperforms B92, while in entanglement-based approaches, BBM92 achieves higher key rates than E91.

What carries the argument

Gaussian beam formalism modeling the optical link with diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise contributions.

If this is right

  • Downlink paths are preferred for satellite-based secure key distribution to maximize rates.
  • BB84 is the stronger choice among prepare-and-measure protocols for satellite use.
  • BBM92 is the stronger choice among entanglement-based protocols for satellite use.
  • Performance degrades with increasing zenith angle and differs between day and night due to noise and turbulence.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Network designers could prioritize downlink geometry when planning constellations for global QKD coverage.
  • The protocol rankings may inform choices in hybrid satellite-terrestrial quantum networks.
  • Extending the model to higher orbits or additional turbulence regimes could test whether the downlink advantage persists.

Load-bearing premise

The Gaussian beam model of the optical link, including diffraction, pointing errors, turbulence, and noise, is accurate enough for the LEO uplink and downlink cases studied.

What would settle it

An experimental measurement on actual LEO satellite QKD links that shows uplink QBER lower than downlink or B92 outperforming BB84 under the modeled conditions.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2308.01036 by Muskan, Ramniwas Meena, Subhashish Banerjee.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Measurements directions for the Ekert protocol. The measurements are depicted in the [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: (a) Plot for transmittance with zenith angle for uplink night-time, (b) Plot for transmit [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: (a) Plot for QBER and keyrate for BB84 protocol with zenith angle for uplink night-time, [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: (a) Plot for QBER and keyrate for B92 protocol with zenith angle for uplink night-time, [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: (a) Plot for QBER and keyrate for BBM92 protocol with zenith angle for uplink night [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: (a)Plot for QBER and keyrate for E91 protocol with zenith angle for uplink night-time, [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_6.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Satellite-based free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a practical framework for achieving secure global communication beyond the limitations of optical fibers. In this work, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secure key rate of four representative protocols-BB84, B92, BBM92, and E91 are investigated over low earth orbit (LEO) links in both uplink and downlink configurations. The optical link is modeled using a Gaussian beam formalism, incorporating the effects of diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise contributions. The protocols are examined under day and night-time operating conditions, and their dependence on the zenith angle is analyzed. The findings show that downlink links generally exhibit lower QBER and higher secure key rates than uplinks, and among prepare-and-measure schemes, BB84 consistently outperforms B92, while in entanglement-based approaches, BBM92 achieves higher key rates than E91.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript analyzes the performance of four QKD protocols (BB84, B92, BBM92, and E91) over LEO satellite free-space links in uplink and downlink configurations. It employs a Gaussian beam model incorporating diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise to compute QBER and secure key rates under day/night conditions as a function of zenith angle. The central claims are that downlinks exhibit lower QBER and higher key rates than uplinks, BB84 outperforms B92 among prepare-and-measure schemes, and BBM92 outperforms E91 among entanglement-based schemes.

Significance. If the link model is accurate, the comparative results offer practical guidance for protocol selection and link configuration in satellite QKD deployments. The side-by-side treatment of prepare-and-measure and entanglement-based protocols under realistic LEO conditions addresses a relevant systems-level question.

major comments (2)
  1. [§3] §3 (optical link model): the uplink/downlink asymmetry in QBER and key rate rests on the turbulence component correctly reproducing stronger scintillation and beam wander for uplinks (full atmospheric path) versus downlinks (turbulence localized near the receiver). The manuscript must specify the exact C_n^2 profile, turbulence spectrum (e.g., Kolmogorov or von Kármán), and zenith-angle dependence used; without this, the reported ordering cannot be verified as robust rather than an artifact of the chosen functional forms.
  2. [§4–5] §4–5 (results): the abstract states headline comparisons but the results sections provide no tabulated numerical values, error bars, or sensitivity analysis for QBER and key rates across the four protocols. This absence prevents assessment of whether the claimed ordering (downlink > uplink, BB84 > B92, BBM92 > E91) remains stable under reasonable variations in pointing jitter or background noise.
minor comments (2)
  1. [§2] Notation for the secure key rate formula should be defined explicitly before its first use; the dependence on the sifting factor and error-correction efficiency is not stated in the abstract or early sections.
  2. [Figures 3–6] Figure captions for the QBER vs. zenith-angle plots should include the specific day/night background photon rates and the assumed receiver aperture diameter.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the thorough review and helpful comments on our manuscript. We address the major comments point by point below and plan to revise the manuscript to incorporate the suggested improvements.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [§3] §3 (optical link model): the uplink/downlink asymmetry in QBER and key rate rests on the turbulence component correctly reproducing stronger scintillation and beam wander for uplinks (full atmospheric path) versus downlinks (turbulence localized near the receiver). The manuscript must specify the exact C_n^2 profile, turbulence spectrum (e.g., Kolmogorov or von Kármán), and zenith-angle dependence used; without this, the reported ordering cannot be verified as robust rather than an artifact of the chosen functional forms.

    Authors: We agree that the specific details of the turbulence model are required to verify the results. We will revise §3 to explicitly provide the C_n^2 profile, the turbulence spectrum, and the zenith-angle dependence used in our calculations. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [§4–5] §4–5 (results): the abstract states headline comparisons but the results sections provide no tabulated numerical values, error bars, or sensitivity analysis for QBER and key rates across the four protocols. This absence prevents assessment of whether the claimed ordering (downlink > uplink, BB84 > B92, BBM92 > E91) remains stable under reasonable variations in pointing jitter or background noise.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the presentation of results would benefit from tabulated data and sensitivity analysis. In the revised manuscript, we will add tables listing the computed QBER and secure key rate values for key zenith angles in both day and night conditions for all four protocols in uplink and downlink configurations. We will also include a sensitivity analysis showing how the protocol ordering holds under variations in pointing jitter and background noise levels. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: standard link model yields protocol comparisons

full rationale

The paper propagates four QKD protocols through an explicit Gaussian-beam link model that incorporates diffraction, pointing errors, turbulence, and noise. The reported orderings (downlink better than uplink; BB84 > B92; BBM92 > E91) are direct numerical outputs of that model under stated conditions, not quantities defined in terms of themselves or obtained by fitting a subset and relabeling the result. No equations, self-citations, or ansatzes are shown to reduce the central claims to their inputs by construction. The derivation chain is therefore self-contained against external physical benchmarks.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The analysis rests on the domain assumption that the chosen Gaussian-beam plus turbulence model is representative; no free parameters or invented entities are visible in the abstract.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Gaussian beam formalism incorporating diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence, and background noise accurately represents LEO satellite optical links.
    Explicitly invoked in the abstract as the basis for computing QBER and key rates.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5680 in / 1238 out tokens · 25456 ms · 2026-05-24T07:16:30.780346+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

55 extracted references · 55 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    Elements of quantum computation and quantum communication

    Anirban Pathak. Elements of quantum computation and quantum communication . CRC Press Boca Raton, 2013, Chapter-8

  2. [2]

    Principle and applications of free space optical communication

    Arockia Bazil Raj, Vishal Sharma, and Subhashish Banerjee. Principle and applications of free space optical communication. IET, UK, 2019

  3. [3]

    Quantum cryptography: A survey

    Dagmar Bruss, Gábor Erdélyi, Tim Meyer, Tobias Riege, and Jörg Rothe. Quantum cryptography: A survey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) , 39(2):6–es, 2007

  4. [4]

    Pirandola, U

    S. Pirandola, U. L. Andersen, L. Banchi, M. Berta, D. Bunandar, R. Colbeck, D. Englund, T. Gehring, C. Lupo, C. Ottaviani, J. L. Pereira, M. Razavi, J. Shamsul Shaari, M. Tomamichel, V. C. Usenko, G. Vallone, P. Villoresi, and P. Wallden. Advances in quantum cryptography.Advances in Optics and Photonics, 12(4):1012, dec 2020

  5. [5]

    Quantum cryptography.Rev

    Nicolas Gisin, Grégoire Ribordy, Wolfgang Tittel, and Hugo Zbinden. Quantum cryptography.Rev. Mod. Phys., 74:145–195, 2002

  6. [6]

    Wootters and Wojciech H

    William K. Wootters and Wojciech H. Zurek. A single quantum cannot be cloned.Nature, 299:802–803, 1982

  7. [7]

    The quantum crypto- graphic switch

    N Srinatha, S Omkar, R Srikanth, Subhashish Banerjee, and Anirban Pathak. The quantum crypto- graphic switch. Quantum Information Processing, 13:59–70, 2014

  8. [8]

    Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing

    Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.06557 , 2020. 14

  9. [9]

    Experimental quantum cryptography

    CharlesH.Bennett, FrançoisBessette, Gilles Brassard, LouisSalvail, andJohnA.Smolin. Experimental quantum cryptography. Journal of Cryptology , 5:3–28, 1991

  10. [10]

    W. T. Buttler, R. J. Hughes, P. G. Kwiat, S. K. Lamoreaux, G. G. Luther, G. L. Morgan, J. E. Nordholt, C. G. Peterson, and C. M. Simmons. Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 1 km.Phys. Rev. Lett., 81:3283–3286, 1998

  11. [11]

    Security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons against individual attacks.Phys

    Edo Waks, Assaf Zeevi, and Yoshihisa Yamamoto. Security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons against individual attacks.Phys. Rev. A , 65:052310, 2002

  12. [12]

    Rarity, Anton Zeilinger, and Harald Weinfurter

    Tobias Schmitt-Manderbach, Henning Weier, Martin Fürst, Rupert Ursin, Felix Tiefenbacher, Thomas Scheidl, Josep Perdigues, Zoran Sodnik, Christian Kurtsiefer, John G. Rarity, Anton Zeilinger, and Harald Weinfurter. Experimental demonstration of free-space decoy-state quantum key distribution over 144 km.Phys. Rev. Lett., 98:010504, 2007

  13. [13]

    Quantum cryptography over non- markovian channels

    Kishore Thapliyal, Anirban Pathak, and Subhashish Banerjee. Quantum cryptography over non- markovian channels. Quantum Information Processing, 16:1–21, 2017

  14. [14]

    Analysis of atmospheric effects on satellite-based quantum communication: a comparative study.Quantum Information Processing, 18:1–24, 2019

    Vishal Sharma and Subhashish Banerjee. Analysis of atmospheric effects on satellite-based quantum communication: a comparative study.Quantum Information Processing, 18:1–24, 2019

  15. [15]

    Theresa H Carbonneau and David Roger Wisely. Opportunities and challenges for optical wireless: the competitive advantage of free space telecommunications links in today’s crowded marketplace.Wireless Technologies and Systems: Millimeter-Wave and Optical , 3232:119–128, 1998

  16. [16]

    Experimental quantum cryptography

    Charles H Bennett, François Bessette, Gilles Brassard, and Louis Salvail. J.Smolin,“Experimental quantum cryptography”.J. Cryptol, 5(1):3–28, 1992

  17. [17]

    Practical aspects of quantum cryptographic key distribution.Journal of Cryptology , 13:207–220, 2000

    Hugo Zbinden, Nicolas Gisin, Bruno Huttner, Antoine Muller, and Wolfgang Tittel. Practical aspects of quantum cryptographic key distribution.Journal of Cryptology , 13:207–220, 2000

  18. [18]

    Photon counting with passively quenched germanium avalanche.Applied Optics, 33(30):6895–6901, 1994

    PCM Owens, JG Rarity, PR Tapster, D Knight, and PD Townsend. Photon counting with passively quenched germanium avalanche.Applied Optics, 33(30):6895–6901, 1994

  19. [19]

    Distributing entanglement and single photons through an intra-city, free-space quantum channel.Optics Express, 13(1):202–209, 2005

    Kevin J Resch, M Lindenthal, B Blauensteiner, HR Böhm, A Fedrizzi, C Kurtsiefer, A Poppe, T Schmitt-Manderbach, M Taraba, R Ursin, et al. Distributing entanglement and single photons through an intra-city, free-space quantum channel.Optics Express, 13(1):202–209, 2005

  20. [20]

    Unconditional security in quantum cryptography

    Dominic Mayers. Unconditional security in quantum cryptography. Journal of the ACM (JACM) , 48(3):351–406, 2001

  21. [21]

    Key to the quantum industry.Physics World, 20(3):24, 2007

    Andrew Shields and Zhiliang Yuan. Key to the quantum industry.Physics World, 20(3):24, 2007

  22. [22]

    Quantum cryptography: An emerging technology in network security

    Mehrdad S Sharbaf. Quantum cryptography: An emerging technology in network security. In2011 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST) , pages 13–19. IEEE, 2011

  23. [23]

    Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 1 km.Physical Review Letters, 81(15):3283, 1998

    WT Buttler, RJ Hughes, Paul G Kwiat, SK Lamoreaux, GG Luther, GL Morgan, JE Nordholt, CG Pe- terson, and CM Simmons. Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 1 km.Physical Review Letters, 81(15):3283, 1998

  24. [24]

    Controlled bidirectional remote state preparation in noisy environment: a generalized view.Quantum Information Processing, 14:3441–3464, 2015

    Vishal Sharma, Chitra Shukla, Subhashish Banerjee, and Anirban Pathak. Controlled bidirectional remote state preparation in noisy environment: a generalized view.Quantum Information Processing, 14:3441–3464, 2015

  25. [25]

    Advances in space quantum communications.IET Quantum Communication , 2(4):182–217, 2021

    Jasminder S Sidhu, Siddarth K Joshi, Mustafa Gündoğan, Thomas Brougham, David Lowndes, Luca Mazzarella, Markus Krutzik, Sonali Mohapatra, Daniele Dequal, Giuseppe Vallone, et al. Advances in space quantum communications.IET Quantum Communication , 2(4):182–217, 2021

  26. [26]

    Strategies for achieving high key rates in satellite- based qkd

    Sebastian Ecker, Bo Liu, Johannes Handsteiner, Matthias Fink, Dominik Rauch, Fabian Steinlechner, Thomas Scheidl, Anton Zeilinger, and Rupert Ursin. Strategies for achieving high key rates in satellite- based qkd. npj Quantum Information , 7(1):5, 2021. 15

  27. [27]

    Analysis of satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution with adaptive optics.arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.06747 , 2021

    Valentina Marulanda Acosta, Daniele Dequal, Matteo Schiavon, Aurélie Montmerle-Bonnefois, Car- oline B Lim, Jean-Marc Conan, and Eleni Diamanti. Analysis of satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution with adaptive optics.arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.06747 , 2021

  28. [28]

    Long-distance free-space quantum cryptography

    Christian Kurtsiefer, P Zarda, M Halder, Ph M Gorman, Paul R Tapster, JG Rarity, and Harald Weinfurter. Long-distance free-space quantum cryptography. In Quantum Optics in Computing and Communications, volume 4917, pages 25–31. SPIE, 2002

  29. [29]

    Effect of noise on practical quantum communication systems.Defence Science Journal, 66(2):186–192, 2016

    Vishal Sharma. Effect of noise on practical quantum communication systems.Defence Science Journal, 66(2):186–192, 2016

  30. [30]

    Progress in satellite quantum key distribution

    Robert Bedington, Juan Miguel Arrazola, and Alexander Ling. Progress in satellite quantum key distribution. npj Quantum Information , 3:1–30, 2017

  31. [31]

    Decoherence can help quantum cryptographic security

    Vishal Sharma, U Shrikant, R Srikanth, and Subhashish Banerjee. Decoherence can help quantum cryptographic security. Quantum Information Processing, 17:1–16, 2018

  32. [32]

    Analysis of quantum key distribution based satellite com- munication

    Vishal Sharma and Subhashish Banerjee. Analysis of quantum key distribution based satellite com- munication. In 2018 9th International Conference on Computing, Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2018

  33. [33]

    Controlled secure direct quantum communication inspired scheme for quantum identity authentication.Quantum Information Processing, 22(13), 2022

    Arindam Dutta and Anirban Pathak. Controlled secure direct quantum communication inspired scheme for quantum identity authentication.Quantum Information Processing, 22(13), 2022

  34. [34]

    A short review on quantum identity authentication protocols: How would Bob know that he is talking with Alice?Quantum Information Processing, 21:369, 2022

    Arindam Dutta and Anirban Pathak. A short review on quantum identity authentication protocols: How would Bob know that he is talking with Alice?Quantum Information Processing, 21:369, 2022

  35. [35]

    Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night.New journal of physics , 4(1):43, jul 2002

    Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs, and Charles G Peterson. Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night.New journal of physics , 4(1):43, jul 2002

  36. [36]

    Charles H. Bennett. Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states.Phys. Rev. Lett., 68, 1992

  37. [37]

    Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem.Physical Review Letters , 67(6):661, 1991

    Artur K Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem.Physical Review Letters , 67(6):661, 1991

  38. [38]

    Quantum cryptography without bell’s theorem

    Charles H Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and N David Mermin. Quantum cryptography without bell’s theorem. Physical Review Letters, 68(5):557, 1992

  39. [39]

    Climate effects on performance of free space optical communication systems in yemen.Frontiers of Optoelectronics, 7:91–101, 2014

    Abdulsalam G Alkholidi and Khalil S Altowij. Climate effects on performance of free space optical communication systems in yemen.Frontiers of Optoelectronics, 7:91–101, 2014

  40. [40]

    Atmospheric effects on free space earth-to-satellite optical link in tropical climate.International Journal of Computer Science, Engineering and Applications, 3(1):17, 2013

    Norhanis Aida M Nor, Md Rafiqul Islam, Wajdi Al-Khateeb, and AZ Suriza. Atmospheric effects on free space earth-to-satellite optical link in tropical climate.International Journal of Computer Science, Engineering and Applications, 3(1):17, 2013

  41. [41]

    Continuous-Variable Quantum Communication over Free-Space Lossy Chan- nels

    Nedasadat Hosseinidehaj. Continuous-Variable Quantum Communication over Free-Space Lossy Chan- nels. PhD thesis, UNSW Sydney, 2017

  42. [42]

    Link budget analysis of free space optical communication link for atmospheric conditions of india.Materials Today: Proceedings, 48:1064–1069, 2022

    Harjeevan Singh and Nitin Mittal. Link budget analysis of free space optical communication link for atmospheric conditions of india.Materials Today: Proceedings, 48:1064–1069, 2022

  43. [43]

    Dust storms properties related to microwave signal propagation.University of Khartoum Engineering Journal, 1(1), 2011

    Sami M Sharif. Dust storms properties related to microwave signal propagation.University of Khartoum Engineering Journal, 1(1), 2011

  44. [44]

    CRC press, 2019

    Zabih Ghassemlooy, Wasiu Popoola, and Sujan Rajbhandari.Optical wireless communications: system and channel modelling with Matlab ®. CRC press, 2019

  45. [45]

    Errata: Fading-lossassessmentinatmosphericfree-spaceoptical communication links with on-off keying.Optical Engineering, 47(6):069801, 2008

    DirkGiggenbachandHennesHenniger. Errata: Fading-lossassessmentinatmosphericfree-spaceoptical communication links with on-off keying.Optical Engineering, 47(6):069801, 2008

  46. [46]

    Larry C Andrews and Ronald L Phillips.Laser beam propagation through random media . 2005

  47. [47]

    Experimentalinvestigation of optimum beam size for fso uplink.Optics Communications, 400:106–114, 2017

    HemaniKaushal, GeorgesKaddoum, ViranderKumarJain, andSubratKar. Experimentalinvestigation of optimum beam size for fso uplink.Optics Communications, 400:106–114, 2017. 16

  48. [48]

    Satellite-based links for quantum key distri- bution: beam effects and weather dependence.New Journal of Physics , 21(9):093055, 2019

    Carlo Liorni, Hermann Kampermann, and Dagmar Bruß. Satellite-based links for quantum key distri- bution: beam effects and weather dependence.New Journal of Physics , 21(9):093055, 2019

  49. [49]

    Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution.Physical Review A, 61(5):052304, 2000

    Norbert Lütkenhaus. Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution.Physical Review A, 61(5):052304, 2000

  50. [50]

    Abdul Khir, M.N

    M.F. Abdul Khir, M.N. Mohd Zain, Iskandar Bahari, Suryadi, and S. Shaari. Implementation of two way quantum key distribution protocol with decoy state. Optics Communications, 285(5):842–845, 2012

  51. [51]

    Influence of coincidence detection through free-space atmospheric turbulence using partial spatial coherence

    Samkelisiwe Purity Phehlukwayo, Marie Louise Umuhire, Yaseera Ismail, Stuti Joshi, and Francesco Petruccione. Influence of coincidence detection through free-space atmospheric turbulence using partial spatial coherence. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.12911 , 2020

  52. [52]

    An introduction to free-space optical communications.Radio- engineering, 19(2), 2010

    Hennes Henniger and Otakar Wilfert. An introduction to free-space optical communications.Radio- engineering, 19(2), 2010

  53. [53]

    Free-space laser communication performance in the atmospheric channel.Journal of Optical and Fiber Communications Reports , 2:345–396, 2005

    Arun Majumdar. Free-space laser communication performance in the atmospheric channel.Journal of Optical and Fiber Communications Reports , 2:345–396, 2005

  54. [54]

    Adenier, Irina Basieva, Andrei Yu

    G. Adenier, Irina Basieva, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Masanori Ohya, and Noboru Watanabe. Double blinding-attack on entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocols.Foundations of Probability and Physics, 1424:9–16, 2011. Appendix A Turbulence Loss-Induced Scintillation loss for Uplink and Downlink Scintillations are characterized by sudden and rapid cha...

  55. [55]

    hot spot,

    (41) Appendix B Turbulence-Induced Beam Wandering Effect In the context of the uplink scenario for FSO from the ground to a satellite, the transmitter is located inside the Earth’s atmosphere, while the receiver is positioned in the far field. In this configuration, the size of the transmitter beam is typically smaller than the outer scale of turbulence, ...