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Power-balanced Memristive Cryptographic Implementation Against Side Channel Attacks

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arxiv 2312.01170 v1 pith:526TUIW3 submitted 2023-12-02 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords hidinglogiccryptographicstrategypowerpower-balancedapproachcircuits
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Memristors, as emerging nano-devices, offer promising performance and exhibit rich electrical dynamic behavior. Having already found success in applications such as neuromorphic and in-memory computing, researchers are now exploring their potential for cryptographic implementations. In this study, we present a novel power-balanced hiding strategy utilizing memristor groups to conceal power consumption in cryptographic logic circuits. Our approach ensures consistent power costs of all 16 logic gates in Complementary-Resistive-Switching-with-Reading (CRS-R) logic family during writing and reading cycles regardless of Logic Input Variable (LIV) values. By constructing hiding groups, we enable an effective power balance in each gate hiding group. Furthermore, experimental validation of our strategy includes the implementation of a cryptographic construction, xor4SBox, using NOR gates. The circuit construction without the hiding strategy and with the hiding strategy undergo T-test analysis, confirming the significant improvement achieved with our approach. Our work presents a substantial advancement in power-balanced hiding methods, offering enhanced security and efficiency in logic circuits.

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