Pith. sign in

REVIEW

Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems: A Survey

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2401.01527 v3 pith:VDQ3YSNE submitted 2024-01-03 cs.IR

Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems: A Survey

classification cs.IR
keywords attackspoisoningarlibcomprehensivedatasetslibrarymaliciousrecommendation
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
0 comments
read the original abstract

Modern recommender systems (RS) have seen substantial success, yet they remain vulnerable to malicious activities, notably poisoning attacks. These attacks involve injecting malicious data into the training datasets of RS, thereby compromising their integrity and manipulating recommendation outcomes for gaining illicit profits. This survey paper provides a systematic and up-to-date review of the research landscape on Poisoning Attacks against Recommendation (PAR). A novel and comprehensive taxonomy is proposed, categorizing existing PAR methodologies into three distinct categories: Component-Specific, Goal-Driven, and Capability Probing. For each category, we discuss its mechanism in detail, along with associated methods. Furthermore, this paper highlights potential future research avenues in this domain. Additionally, to facilitate and benchmark the empirical comparison of PAR, we introduce an open-source library, ARLib, which encompasses a comprehensive collection of PAR models and common datasets. The library is released at https://github.com/CoderWZW/ARLib.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.