pith. sign in

arxiv: 2510.02947 · v3 · submitted 2025-10-03 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.NI

SoK: Preconfirmations

Pith reviewed 2026-05-18 10:45 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.NI
keywords preconfirmationsblockchain protocolsSoKtransaction confirmationeconomics of blockchainssecurity risksframework designreal-world implementations
0
0 comments X

The pith

Preconfirmation protocols provide early guarantees of eventual transaction inclusion in blockchains to reduce user uncertainty.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge on preconfirmations in blockchains. It introduces core definitions, proposes a general framework for such protocols, analyzes their economics and risks, and surveys real-world implementations. A sympathetic reader cares because these protocols address the delay between issuing a transaction and its confirmation, potentially improving user experience in applications relying on quick assurances. The work aims to bridge theory and practice by applying the framework to existing systems.

Core claim

The central claim is that preconfirmations can be understood through a unified framework that includes terms like early guarantees of inclusion, structures the protocols, explores economic incentives for preconfirmers, identifies risks such as equivocation, and demonstrates applicability to practical deployments across different blockchains.

What carries the argument

The general framework for preconfirmation protocols that structures definitions, economics, risks, and comparisons of implementations.

If this is right

  • Protocols can be compared consistently across different blockchain platforms using the shared framework.
  • Risks like provider misbehavior can be systematically identified and mitigated in preconfirmation designs.
  • Economic models help balance incentives for providing preconfirmations with security requirements.
  • Future protocol designs benefit from standardized terminology and risk assessment methods.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The framework could be tested against preconfirmation services in newer layer-2 networks to check for overlooked edge cases.
  • Economic analysis of incentives might help predict how markets for preconfirmation services evolve under competition.
  • Users of high-volume applications could gain more predictable experiences if protocols adopt the risk categories outlined.

Load-bearing premise

Diverse preconfirmation protocols share enough common features that a single general framework can describe them all without missing key security details specific to each implementation.

What would settle it

Identification of a real-world preconfirmation service whose operational details or security properties cannot be analyzed using the proposed framework terms, economics, or risks would show the systematization is incomplete.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2510.02947 by Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka, Conor McMenamin, Demetris Kyriacou, Lin Oshitani, Quentin Botha.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Preconf Protocol Flow. The remainder of this section goes through this preconf protocol flow, which we decompose into the six steps of preconfing. 5.1 Step 1: Preconfer Registration The first step in the preconf protocol flow is preconfer registration (see [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Preconfer Fault Decision Tree permissionless or permissioned, the type of proof required to trigger preconfer punishment, and the level of punishment [38]. In a permissioned overseer setting, observation and triggering of punishments are driven by the permissioned overseer. Generally, the proofs required to initiate punishment for permissioned overseers are less rigorous. Punishing conditions do not necess… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

In recent years, significant research efforts have focused on improving blockchain throughput and confirmation speeds without compromising security. While decreasing the time it takes for a transaction to be included in the blockchain ledger enhances user experience, a fundamental delay still remains between when a transaction is issued by a user and when its inclusion is confirmed in the blockchain ledger. This delay limits user experience gains through the confirmation uncertainty it brings for users. This inherent delay in conventional blockchain protocols has led to the emergence of preconfirmation protocols -- protocols that provide users with early guarantees of eventual transaction confirmation. This article presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on preconfirmations. We present the core terms and definitions needed to understand preconfirmations, outline a general framework for preconfirmation protocols, and explore the economics and risks of preconfirmations. Finally, we survey and apply our framework to several implementations of real-world preconfirmation protocols, bridging the gap between theory and practice.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

1 major / 2 minor

Summary. This paper is a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on preconfirmation protocols for blockchains. It introduces core terms and definitions, proposes a general framework for preconfirmation protocols, discusses the economics and risks involved, and surveys real-world implementations by applying the proposed framework to bridge theory and practice.

Significance. If the general framework successfully unifies diverse preconfirmation protocols while preserving key security and economic properties, this SoK would provide significant value to the blockchain research community by establishing common terminology and a structured way to analyze and compare protocols. The survey of implementations adds practical relevance. The paper appropriately references external implementations and prior definitions without introducing self-referential or fitted claims.

major comments (1)
  1. [Abstract and §1] Abstract and §1 (Introduction): The manuscript provides no description of the literature search methodology, inclusion/exclusion criteria for selecting the surveyed preconfirmation implementations, or how the framework was checked against edge cases and threat models. This is load-bearing for the central survey claim, as it prevents assessment of whether the framework application is comprehensive across the diversity of blockchain protocols.
minor comments (2)
  1. [§3] §3 (Framework): Explicitly state how the general framework retains implementation-specific security properties (e.g., under different consensus mechanisms) rather than abstracting them away, to address the risk of losing critical details in comparisons.
  2. [Throughout] Throughout: Define all acronyms at first use and ensure that references to specific real-world implementations (e.g., in the survey section) include enough context on their threat models for readers new to the sub-area.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive feedback and positive recommendation for minor revision. We address the single major comment below and will update the manuscript accordingly to improve transparency.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Abstract and §1] Abstract and §1 (Introduction): The manuscript provides no description of the literature search methodology, inclusion/exclusion criteria for selecting the surveyed preconfirmation implementations, or how the framework was checked against edge cases and threat models. This is load-bearing for the central survey claim, as it prevents assessment of whether the framework application is comprehensive across the diversity of blockchain protocols.

    Authors: We agree that explicitly documenting the literature search methodology, inclusion/exclusion criteria, and framework validation process would strengthen the paper's transparency and allow readers to better evaluate the survey's scope. In the revised version, we will add a dedicated subsection (likely in §1 or as a new §1.1) describing: (1) our search strategy using academic databases (Google Scholar, arXiv, IEEE Xplore) and keywords including 'preconfirmation', 'pre-confirmations', 'early transaction confirmation', 'blockchain pre-confirmation' combined with ecosystem-specific terms; (2) inclusion criteria focused on protocols providing pre-block guarantees with either deployed implementations or detailed public specifications in major blockchain systems; (3) exclusion criteria such as purely theoretical models without practical considerations or protocols not centered on transaction inclusion guarantees; and (4) how the framework was stress-tested by applying it to diverse implementations (e.g., optimistic rollups, based sequencing, and sidechain variants) while cross-referencing against established threat models from the blockchain literature (double-spending, reorg attacks, economic incentives for misbehavior). This addition will directly address the concern without altering the core contributions. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity in this SoK survey

full rationale

This is a Systematization of Knowledge paper whose core contribution is definitional and organizational: it introduces terms, outlines a general framework drawn from existing literature, discusses economics/risks, and applies the framework to surveyed real-world implementations. No load-bearing step reduces by construction to a self-referential equation, fitted parameter renamed as prediction, or self-citation chain that is itself unverified. All framework elements and comparisons reference external protocols and prior definitions rather than deriving novel results from internal inputs. The manuscript is therefore self-contained against external benchmarks with no circularity.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The paper relies on standard domain assumptions from blockchain literature without introducing new free parameters or invented entities; the systematization draws on existing definitions and implementations.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Conventional blockchain protocols have an inherent delay between transaction issuance and ledger inclusion that creates confirmation uncertainty.
    Explicitly stated in the abstract as the fundamental motivation for preconfirmation protocols.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5704 in / 1245 out tokens · 46332 ms · 2026-05-18T10:45:36.773454+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Lean theorems connected to this paper

Citations machine-checked in the Pith Canon. Every link opens the source theorem in the public Lean library.

What do these tags mean?
matches
The paper's claim is directly supported by a theorem in the formal canon.
supports
The theorem supports part of the paper's argument, but the paper may add assumptions or extra steps.
extends
The paper goes beyond the formal theorem; the theorem is a base layer rather than the whole result.
uses
The paper appears to rely on the theorem as machinery.
contradicts
The paper's claim conflicts with a theorem or certificate in the canon.
unclear
Pith found a possible connection, but the passage is too broad, indirect, or ambiguous to say the theorem truly supports the claim.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

111 extracted references · 111 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    Parallel chains: Improving throughput and latency of blockchain protocols via parallel composition,

    M. Fitzi, P. Gaži, A. Kiayias, and A. Russell, “Parallel chains: Improving throughput and latency of blockchain protocols via parallel composition,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1119,

  2. [2]

    Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1119

    [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1119

  3. [3]

    Manifoldchain: Maximizing Blockchain Through- put via Bandwidth-Clustered Sharding,

    C. Che, S. Li, and X. Wang, “Manifoldchain: Maximizing Blockchain Through- put via Bandwidth-Clustered Sharding,” inProceedings of the 32nd Annual Net- work and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). San Diego, CA: Inter- net Society, Feb. 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/ manifoldchain-maximizing-blockchain-thro...

  4. [4]

    Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols with near-optimal throughput,

    M. Fitzi, P. Gazi, A. Kiayias, and A. Russell, “Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols with near-optimal throughput,”IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., vol. 2020, p. 37, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:210704648

  5. [5]

    Anthemius: Efficient & modular block assembly for concurrent execution,

    R. Neiheiser and E. Kokoris-Kogias, “Anthemius: Efficient & modular block assembly for concurrent execution,” 2025. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.10074

  6. [6]

    Scaling

    Ethereum, “Scaling.” [Online]. Available: https://ethereum.org/developers/docs/scaling/

  7. [7]

    Optimism,

    Optimism, “Optimism,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/ ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94

  8. [8]

    Arbitrum Docs

    Arbitrum, “Arbitrum Docs.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.arbitrum.io/welcome/ arbitrum-gentle-introduction

  9. [9]

    ZKsync Docs

    ZKsync, “ZKsync Docs.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.zksync.io

  10. [10]

    Taiko Preconf Design

    Luban, “Taiko Preconf Design.” [Online]. Available: https://hackmd.io/@luban/HJY_X9y1le

  11. [11]

    Low Latency Block Updates (Shredstream)

    J. Labs, “Low Latency Block Updates (Shredstream).” [Online]. Available: https://docs.jito.wtf/ lowlatencytxnfeed/

  12. [12]

    Awesome Based Preconfirmations

    Fabric, “Awesome Based Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://eth-fabric.github.io/ website/education/awesome-based-preconfs#introduction

  13. [13]

    Preconfirmations Glossary & Requirements

    G. Spasov, “Preconfirmations Glossary & Requirements.” [Online]. Available: https: //hackmd.io/@Perseverance/Sy4a_BX2p

  14. [14]

    Preconfirmations: Explained

    Luganodes, “Preconfirmations: Explained.” [Online]. Available: https://www.luganodes.com/ blog/preconfirmations-explained/

  15. [15]

    Introduction to Smart Contracts

    Ethereum, “Introduction to Smart Contracts.” [Online]. Available: https://ethereum.org/en/ developers/docs/smart-contracts/

  16. [16]

    Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)

    Chainlink, “Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).” [Online]. Available: https://chain.link/ education-hub/maximal-extractable-value-mev

  17. [17]

    Proposer-builder separation

    Ethereum, “Proposer-builder separation.” [Online]. Available: https://ethereum.org/roadmap/ pbs/

  18. [18]

    The Merge – The Beacon Chain,

    ——, “The Merge – The Beacon Chain,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Avail- able: https://github.com/ethereum/annotated-spec/blob/master/merge/beacon-chain.md?utm_ source#executionpayload

  19. [19]

    Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party,

    M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter, “Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party,” inProceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’97. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 1997, pp. 1–6. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/266420.266424

  20. [20]

    Mev-boost,

    Flashbots, “Mev-boost,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/flashbots/ mev-boost

  21. [21]

    Mev-boost dashboard

    A. Wahrstätter, “Mev-boost dashboard.” [Online]. Available: https://mevboost.pics/ 30

  22. [22]

    Eip-7917: Deterministic proposer lookahead

    L. Oshitani and J. Drake, “Eip-7917: Deterministic proposer lookahead.” [Online]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7917

  23. [23]

    EIP-7607: Hardfork Meta - Fusaka

    T. Beiko, A. Stokes, and A. Dietrichs, “EIP-7607: Hardfork Meta - Fusaka.” [Online]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7607

  24. [24]

    How do layer 2s really differ from execution sharding?

    V. Buterin, “How do layer 2s really differ from execution sharding?” [Online]. Available: https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/05/23/l2exec.html

  25. [25]

    Examining the Based Sequencing Spectrum

    J. Bostoen, “Examining the Based Sequencing Spectrum.” [Online]. Available: https: //research.chainbound.io/examining-the-based-sequencing-spectrum

  26. [26]

    Based rollups—superpowers from L1 sequencing

    J. Drake, “Based rollups—superpowers from L1 sequencing.” [Online]. Available: https: //ethresear.ch/t/based-rollups-superpowers-from-l1-sequencing/15016

  27. [27]

    Starknet Docs: Transactions

    Starknet, “Starknet Docs: Transactions.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.starknet.io/learn/ protocol/transactions

  28. [28]

    The state of Arbitrum’s progressive decentralization

    Arbitrum, “The state of Arbitrum’s progressive decentralization.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/state-of-progressive-decentralization

  29. [29]

    Starknet’s token: STRK

    Starknet, “Starknet’s token: STRK.” [Online]. Available: https://governance.starknet.io/learn/ starknet’s_token:_strk

  30. [30]

    Governance in Season 8: The Next Phase

    Optimism, “Governance in Season 8: The Next Phase.” [Online]. Available: https: //optimism.mirror.xyz/JR5YEsK9-bM6At6c6iC5RiNNE4XXi0sMp3ytINq0wXw

  31. [31]

    Documentation - Understanding mev-commit

    Primev, “Documentation - Understanding mev-commit.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.primev. xyz/v1.1.0/concepts/network-overview

  32. [32]

    Preconfirmations for Vanilla Based Rollups,

    G. Spasov and D. Ivanov, “Preconfirmations for Vanilla Based Rollups,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/LimeChain/based-preconfirmations-research/blob/main/ docs/preconfirmations-for-vanilla-based-rollups.md

  33. [33]

    A Pricing Model for Inclusion Preconfirmations

    F. Casey-Fierro, C. McMenamin, L. Feroleto, and F. Mosterts, “A Pricing Model for Inclusion Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://research.lido.fi/t/ a-pricing-model-for-inclusion-preconfirmations/9136

  34. [34]

    Analysing Expected Proposer Revenue from Preconfirmations

    C. McMenamin, “Analysing Expected Proposer Revenue from Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://research.lido.fi/t/analysing-expected-proposer-revenue-from-preconfirmations/ 8954

  35. [35]

    A Taxonomy of Preconfirmation Guarantees and Their Slash- ing Conditions in Rollups

    J. Delong, “A Taxonomy of Preconfirmation Guarantees and Their Slash- ing Conditions in Rollups.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ a-taxonomy-of-preconfirmation-guarantees-and-their-slashing-conditions-in-rollups/22130

  36. [36]

    The Preconfirmation Gateway ˜ Unlocking Preconfirmations: From User to Preconfer

    Matthew, “The Preconfirmation Gateway ˜ Unlocking Preconfirmations: From User to Preconfer.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ the-preconfirmation-gateway-unlocking-preconfirmations-from-user-to-preconfer/18812

  37. [37]

    Ahead-of-Time Block Auctions To Enable Execution Preconfirmations

    I. Shaik, “Ahead-of-Time Block Auctions To Enable Execution Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Avail- able: https://ethresear.ch/t/ahead-of-time-block-auctions-to-enable-execution-preconfirmations/ 21345

  38. [38]

    Delegation in Bolt: Outsourcing Sophistication While Preserving Decentralization

    F. Mosterts and J. Bostoen, “Delegation in Bolt: Outsourcing Sophistication While Preserving Decentralization.” [Online]. Available: https://research.chainbound.io/ delegation-in-bolt-outsourcing-sophistication-while-preserving-decentralization

  39. [39]

    Preconfirmation Fair Exchange

    C. McMenamin, “Preconfirmation Fair Exchange.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ preconfirmation-fair-exchange/21891

  40. [40]

    Leaderless and Leader-Based Preconfirmations

    C. Matt, “Leaderless and Leader-Based Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https: //ethresear.ch/t/leaderless-and-leader-based-preconfirmations/19971 31

  41. [41]

    Credibly Neutral Preconfirmation Collateral: The Pre- confirmation Registry

    Matthew, “Credibly Neutral Preconfirmation Collateral: The Pre- confirmation Registry.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ credibly-neutral-preconfirmation-collateral-the-preconfirmation-registry/19634

  42. [42]

    Preconfirmation Registry,

    Spire Labs, “Preconfirmation Registry,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https: //github.com/spire-labs

  43. [43]

    Universal Registry Contract

    Fabric, “Universal Registry Contract.” [Online]. Available: https://eth-fabric.github.io/website/ development/l1-components/urc

  44. [44]

    Documentation - Registering as a Provider

    Primev, “Documentation - Registering as a Provider.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.primev. xyz/v1.1.0/get-started/providers/registering-a-provider

  45. [45]

    Restaking Overview

    EigenCloud, “Restaking Overview.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.eigencloud.xyz/products/ eigenlayer/restakers/concepts/overview

  46. [46]

    Restaking 101: A Primer on EigenLayer

    B. Wee, “Restaking 101: A Primer on EigenLayer.” [Online]. Available: https://medium.com/ %40benhwx/restaking-101-a-primer-on-eigenlayer-ad9bc69875bc

  47. [47]

    GitHub - Universal Registry Contract,

    Fabric, “GitHub - Universal Registry Contract,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/eth-fabric/urc

  48. [48]

    Unified Preconf Registry

    Matthew, “Unified Preconf Registry.” [Online]. Available: https://hackmd.io/@mteam/ unfiedpreconfregistry

  49. [49]

    Vanilla Based Sequencing

    G. Spasov and D. Ivanov, “Vanilla Based Sequencing.” [Online]. Available: https: //ethresear.ch/t/vanilla-based-sequencing/19379

  50. [50]

    Taiyi - off-chain components

    Luban, “Taiyi - off-chain components.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.luban.wtf/learn/ architecture/off_chain_components/overview

  51. [51]

    Towards an implementation of based preconfirma- tions leveraging restaking

    Cairo, “Towards an implementation of based preconfirma- tions leveraging restaking.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ towards-an-implementation-of-based-preconfirmations-leveraging-restaking/19211

  52. [52]

    Intent-Based Architecture and Their Risks

    G. Konstantopoulos and Q. Kilbourn, “Intent-Based Architecture and Their Risks.” [Online]. Available: https://www.paradigm.xyz/2023/06/intents

  53. [53]

    Proposer-Commitment Infrastructure in Ethereum

    S. Brown, “Proposer-Commitment Infrastructure in Ethereum.” [Online]. Available: https: //simbro.medium.com/proposer-commitment-infrastructure-in-ethereum-61ad3b31f05f

  54. [54]

    Opportunities and Considerations of Ethereum’s Blockspace Future

    D. Van der Werff and A. Matthews, “Opportunities and Considerations of Ethereum’s Blockspace Future.” [Online]. Available: https://frontier.tech/ethereums-blockspace-future

  55. [55]

    Blockspace Futures

    TL;DR The Latest in Defi Research, “Blockspace Futures.” [Online]. Available: https: //www.thelatestindefi.org/tldr/tldr-request-for-papers/blockspace-futures

  56. [56]

    The Derivation Pipeline

    Espresso Systems, “The Derivation Pipeline.” [Online]. Available: https://hackmd.io/ @EspressoSystems/the-derivation-pipeline#Signing-atomic-bundle-transactions

  57. [57]

    Analyzing BFT & Proposer-Promised Preconfirmations

    E. Davidson, “Analyzing BFT & Proposer-Promised Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/analyzing-bft-proposer-promised-preconfirmations/17963

  58. [58]

    Documentation - Bid Decay Mechanism

    Primev, “Documentation - Bid Decay Mechanism.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.primev.xyz/ v1.1.0/concepts/bids/bid-decay-mechanism

  59. [59]

    Order flow, auctions and centralisation II: or- der flow auctions

    Q. Kilbourn, “Order flow, auctions and centralisation II: or- der flow auctions.” [Online]. Available: https://collective.flashbots.net/t/ order-flow-auctions-and-centralisation-ii-order-flow-auctions/284

  60. [60]

    User-Defined Penalties: Ensuring Honest Preconf Behavior

    J. Burian, “User-Defined Penalties: Ensuring Honest Preconf Behavior.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/user-defined-penalties-ensuring-honest-preconf-behavior/19545

  61. [61]

    Documentation - Bid Structure

    Primev, “Documentation - Bid Structure.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.primev.xyz/v1.1.0/ concepts/bids/bid-structure 32

  62. [62]

    Based Preconfirmations with Multi-round MEV-Boost

    L. Oshitani, “Based Preconfirmations with Multi-round MEV-Boost.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/based-preconfirmations-with-multi-round-mev-boost/20091

  63. [63]

    Documentation - Commitments

    Primev, “Documentation - Commitments.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.primev.xyz/v1.1.0/ concepts/commitments

  64. [64]

    Fairness in electronic commerce,

    N. Asokan, “Fairness in electronic commerce,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, CAN, 1998, uML Order No. GAXNQ-32811

  65. [65]

    On the Impossibility of Fair Exchange without a Trusted Third Party,

    H. Pagnia and F. C. G. Darmstadt, “On the Impossibility of Fair Exchange without a Trusted Third Party,” 1999. [Online]. Available: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:11671049

  66. [66]

    Future-Proofing Preconfirmations

    A.-P. Stouka and C. McMenamin, “Future-Proofing Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/future-proofing-preconfirmations/22618

  67. [67]

    Partially ordered knapsack and applications to scheduling,

    S. G. Kolliopoulos and G. Steiner, “Partially ordered knapsack and applications to scheduling,” Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 155, no. 8, pp. 889–897, 2007. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166218X0600388X

  68. [68]

    Online Block Packing

    A. Ben-Eliezer and N. Nisan, “Online Block Packing.” [Online]. Available: https: //www.arxiv.org/pdf/2507.12357

  69. [69]

    Constraints API Specification,

    Fabric, “Constraints API Specification,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https: //github.com/eth-fabric/constraints-specs/blob/main/specs/constraints-api.md

  70. [70]

    Fault Attribution,

    ——, “Fault Attribution,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/eth-fabric/ constraints-specs/blob/main/specs/fault-attribution.md

  71. [71]

    Based preconfirmations

    RISE Book, “Based preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.risechain.com/rise-stack/ based-preconfs.html

  72. [72]

    Avoiding Accidental Liveness Faults for Based Preconfs

    Matthew, “Avoiding Accidental Liveness Faults for Based Preconfs.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/avoiding-accidental-liveness-faults-for-based-preconfs/19888

  73. [73]

    Based preconfirmations

    J. Drake, “Based preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ based-preconfirmations/17353

  74. [74]

    GitHub - Example Slasher Implementations,

    Fabric, “GitHub - Example Slasher Implementations,” GitHub repository. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/eth-fabric/urc/tree/main/example

  75. [75]

    Preconfirmations under the NO lens

    U. Natale, “Preconfirmations under the NO lens.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ preconfirmations-under-the-no-lens/19975

  76. [76]

    Estimating the Revenue from Indepen- dent Sub-Slot Auction Preconfirmations

    F. Casey-Fierro and C. McMenamin, “Estimating the Revenue from Indepen- dent Sub-Slot Auction Preconfirmations.” [Online]. Available: https://research.lido.fi/t/ estimating-the-revenue-from-independent-sub-slot-auction-preconfirmations/8801

  77. [77]

    Measuring validator economics under preconfirmations: Early mainnet evidence

    M. Akdeniz, “Measuring validator economics under preconfirmations: Early mainnet evidence.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/ measuring-validator-economics-under-preconfirmations-early-mainnet-evidence/

  78. [78]

    Transaction fee mechanism design for the ethereum blockchain: An economic analysis of EIP-1559,

    T. Roughgarden, “Transaction fee mechanism design for the ethereum blockchain: An economic analysis of EIP-1559,”CoRR, vol. abs/2012.00854, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.00854

  79. [79]

    Pricing Transactions for Preconfirmation

    B. Robaglia, U. Natale, and M. Moser, “Pricing Transactions for Preconfirmation.” [Online]. Available: https://ethresear.ch/t/pricing-transactions-for-preconfirmation/21802

  80. [80]

    Commit-Boost Docs - Introduction

    Commit-Boost, “Commit-Boost Docs - Introduction.” [Online]. Available: https://commit-boost. github.io/commit-boost-client/

Showing first 80 references.