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arxiv: 2510.08101 · v3 · submitted 2025-10-09 · 💻 cs.CR

LLM-Assisted Web Measurements

Pith reviewed 2026-05-18 09:23 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords large language modelsweb measurementswebsite classificationsecurity measurementsprivacy analysisTranco listtargeted studies
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The pith

Large language models can classify websites from lists like Tranco to support targeted security and privacy measurements at scale.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper investigates the use of LLMs to add semantic labels to popular but unlabeled website lists, which currently force researchers into ad-hoc choices that limit targeted studies. It evaluates several models on classification tasks drawn from prior web measurement work and finds strong results overall, with clear differences based on which model and settings are chosen. A two-step process is introduced to manage the accuracy-efficiency trade-off when processing large lists. The authors then run example security and privacy measurements with this method and check that the derived conclusions match those from earlier research. This removes a practical barrier to studying specific categories of sites without manual bias.

Core claim

LLMs achieve strong performance across multiple website classification scenarios relevant to security and privacy research, though model choice and configuration significantly affect both accuracy and computational cost. A practical two-step methodology enables scalable targeted web measurements starting from the Tranco list. When this methodology is applied to studies inspired by prior work, the resulting research inferences remain consistent with earlier findings.

What carries the argument

Two-step LLM classification pipeline that narrows candidates from the Tranco list then assigns category labels for security or privacy analysis.

If this is right

  • Targeted measurements of specific website categories become feasible without ad-hoc selection rules.
  • Researchers can trade classification accuracy against compute cost by choosing different models or step thresholds.
  • Prior targeted studies can be replicated or extended more systematically from the same starting list.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same pipeline could be applied to other unlabeled web lists or snapshots to enable category-specific analysis in new domains.
  • Periodic re-classification of evolving sites might keep measurements current without rebuilding the entire dataset each time.
  • Integration with lighter-weight filters before the LLM step could further reduce cost for very large lists.

Load-bearing premise

The hand-curated test datasets reflect the actual distribution of sites that researchers encounter in security and privacy studies, and LLM outputs stay reliable when the method is applied to millions of sites.

What would settle it

A large-scale manual audit of LLM labels on a fresh random sample drawn from the current Tranco list would show whether classification accuracy holds outside the original evaluation sets.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2510.08101 by Lorenzo Cazzaro, Simone Bozzolan, Stefano Calzavara.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Percentage of websites with minimal scope by cate [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Percentage of websites with third-party trackers by [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Percentage of websites with minimal scope by cate [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_3.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Web measurements are a well-established methodology for assessing the security and privacy landscape of the Internet. However, existing top lists of popular websites are unlabeled and lack semantic information about the nature of the included websites, making targeted web measurements challenging, as researchers often rely on ad-hoc techniques to bias datasets toward specific website classes of interest. In this paper, we investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) to enable targeted web measurement studies. Building on prior literature, we identify key website classification tasks relevant to web measurements and highlight limitations in state-of-the-art classification approaches. We construct carefully curated datasets to evaluate different LLMs on these tasks. Our results show that LLMs can achieve strong performance across multiple classification scenarios, but the choice of model and configuration plays a significant role. Motivated by the observed trade-off between classification accuracy and computational efficiency, we propose a practical two-step methodology for scalable targeted web measurements starting from the Tranco list. Finally, we conduct LLM-assisted web measurement studies inspired by prior work using our methodology and assess the validity of the resulting research inferences, showing that LLMs can effectively enable targeted measurements of security and privacy trends on the Web.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

1 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper explores using LLMs to classify websites for targeted security and privacy web measurements. It identifies relevant classification tasks, builds curated evaluation datasets, reports strong LLM performance that varies by model and prompt configuration, proposes a two-step methodology to scale from the Tranco list while balancing accuracy and efficiency, and validates the approach through example measurement studies with an assessment of inference validity.

Significance. If the empirical results and validity claims hold under distribution shift, the work would provide a practical, scalable alternative to ad-hoc website selection in web measurement studies, potentially improving reproducibility and focus in security and privacy research. The two-step methodology and explicit validity checks are constructive contributions.

major comments (1)
  1. Validity assessment section: the paper reports strong performance on curated datasets and performs some validity checks on the resulting inferences, but does not quantify how label noise or distribution shift from the evaluation sets to the full Tranco distribution would affect downstream trend measurements (e.g., no sensitivity analysis or error-propagation bounds on reported security/privacy statistics). This is load-bearing for the central claim that LLM-assisted measurements support valid research inferences at scale.
minor comments (2)
  1. Abstract and results sections: quantitative performance numbers, error bars, dataset sizes, and exact evaluation metrics are referenced but not summarized with sufficient detail for readers to assess the 'strong performance' claim without reading the full evaluation tables.
  2. Methodology section: the two-step procedure is described at a high level; clarifying the exact filtering thresholds and fallback rules would improve reproducibility.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive feedback on our manuscript. We address the major comment below and describe the revisions we will make to strengthen the validity assessment.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: Validity assessment section: the paper reports strong performance on curated datasets and performs some validity checks on the resulting inferences, but does not quantify how label noise or distribution shift from the evaluation sets to the full Tranco distribution would affect downstream trend measurements (e.g., no sensitivity analysis or error-propagation bounds on reported security/privacy statistics). This is load-bearing for the central claim that LLM-assisted measurements support valid research inferences at scale.

    Authors: We agree that a quantitative treatment of label noise and distribution shift is important for supporting claims about valid inferences at scale. The manuscript currently includes validity checks via example measurement studies that compare LLM-derived trends against prior literature and external benchmarks. To directly address the referee's concern, we will add a sensitivity analysis subsection. This will simulate classification error rates drawn from our evaluation results, model distribution shifts from the curated sets to Tranco, and report bounds on the impact to downstream security and privacy statistics. We believe this revision will make the central claim more robust. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: empirical LLM evaluation on curated tasks

full rationale

The paper is a standard empirical evaluation of off-the-shelf LLMs on website classification tasks relevant to security and privacy measurements. It constructs new curated datasets, measures accuracy and efficiency trade-offs across models and prompts, proposes a practical two-step filtering methodology motivated by those measurements, and then applies the approach to produce example studies while checking validity. No equations, fitted parameters, or derived predictions appear anywhere in the work. There are no self-definitional loops, no renaming of known results as novel derivations, and no load-bearing self-citations that substitute for independent justification. The central claims rest on direct experimental results and external validity checks rather than reducing to the inputs by construction. This is the expected non-circular outcome for an applied measurement paper.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

1 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on the assumption that LLMs can reliably perform the identified classification tasks when given appropriate prompts and that the evaluation datasets capture the relevant distribution of websites.

free parameters (1)
  • LLM model and prompt configuration
    Performance varies significantly with choice of model and configuration, which must be selected for each task.
axioms (1)
  • domain assumption LLM outputs on website text can be treated as accurate labels for security and privacy research purposes
    Invoked when claiming that the resulting measurements support valid research inferences.

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Forward citations

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Reference graph

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