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arxiv: 2511.04047 · v7 · pith:BI3SQUJ5new · submitted 2025-11-06 · 🧬 q-bio.NC · cs.NE

Considering a generative mechanism of consciousness from the perspective of inter-level causation

Yoshiyuki Ohmura , Yasuo Kuniyoshi This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-18 00:28 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🧬 q-bio.NC cs.NE
keywords consciousnesscausationinter-level causalitydual-laws modelcausal stancefunctional consciousnessgenerative mechanism
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The pith

Consciousness arises from a system's internal causal mechanisms that transmit higher-level influences to lower levels via distinct dynamical laws.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

This paper argues that the presence of consciousness in some physical systems but not others is best addressed through the Causal Stance rather than physics alone. It treats inter-level causality as an explicit mechanism that can be formalized inside a system, using an asymmetric cause-effect relation to show how higher-level causes reach lower levels without external input. The central proposal is the Dual-Laws Model, in which separate dynamical laws operate at each level to realize these transmissions and thereby generate functional consciousness. A reader would care because the account locates the difference between conscious and non-conscious systems in their self-contained causal architecture instead of in observable behavior or phenomenology.

Core claim

The generation of consciousness is determined by its internal causal mechanisms in the Causal Stance. These mechanisms are realized by treating inter-level causality as an explicit process rather than an emergent byproduct: causes originating at higher levels are transmitted to lower levels through the Dual-Laws Model, which applies distinct dynamical laws at each level. The resulting intrinsic causal conditions, rather than external interventions, suffice for functional consciousness.

What carries the argument

The Dual-Laws Model, which applies separate dynamical laws at higher and lower levels so that higher-level causes can be transmitted directly to lower-level dynamics inside the system.

If this is right

  • Functional consciousness can be generated solely from internal causal relations without any external interventions.
  • Higher-level causes reach lower levels only when the system maintains distinct dynamical laws at each level.
  • The Causal Stance supplies conditions for consciousness that are independent of the Physical Stance.
  • Once the Dual-Laws Model is in place, the system's own causal architecture determines whether consciousness is present.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same causal architecture might be implemented in artificial systems to test whether they can meet the internal criteria for functional consciousness.
  • Current computational models of the brain could be re-examined for the presence or absence of explicit inter-level causal transmission.
  • The distinction between Causal and Physical Stances suggests that consciousness research can proceed by designing causal structures first and then asking which physical realizations satisfy them.

Load-bearing premise

Inter-level causality can be treated as an explicit, necessary, and sufficient mechanism for generating functional consciousness once it is formalized inside a causal model.

What would settle it

Build or simulate a system that obeys the Dual-Laws Model with explicit higher-to-lower causal transmission and observe whether it produces the expected functional consciousness; or identify a system that exhibits functional consciousness yet lacks such inter-level causal transmission.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2511.04047 by Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Yoshiyuki Ohmura.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Dual-laws model: The system consists of self-referential feedback control mechanism, circuit B for modifying the algebraic equations used to define feedback errors at the psychological level, and other micro-level circuits A. In self-referential feedback mechanism, whole is a set of macro mathematical functions, and the constituent parts are neurons and synapses within the functions. Bold-line rectangles r… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Why do some physical systems possess consciousness, while others do not? We view consciousness not as a subjective experience, but rather as a physical event accompanying experience. Is this a question of physics? Or is it a question of the theory of causation? Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes. To describe a causal model, we introduce an asymmetric relation between cause and effect that is necessary for describing causality, but not physical laws. We propose that the generation of consciousness is determined by a system's internal causal mechanisms, rather than by a system's functions (i.e., physically determined input-output relations). To explain these intrinsic causes, we focus on whole-to-parts causality. Traditionally, whole-to-parts causality is considered an emergent phenomenon rather than a mechanism. We devise a method for explicitly implementing these mechanisms in a causal model by examining how causes originating at higher levels are transmitted to lower levels within a system. We then propose a dual-laws model (DLM), which features distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels. Finally, we discuss the generation of functional consciousness and its causality based on the DLM.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper proposes that consciousness is generated by internal causal mechanisms viewed from a 'Causal Stance' (distinct from the 'Physical Stance'), and introduces a Dual-Laws Model (DLM) to explicitly realize inter-level causation. In the DLM, higher-level causes are transmitted to lower levels via distinct dynamical laws at each level and an asymmetric cause-effect relation, making these internal mechanisms both necessary and sufficient for functional consciousness rather than treating inter-level causality as an emergent phenomenon.

Significance. If the DLM were formalized with explicit equations and shown to produce consciousness-like behavior, the framework could contribute to theoretical discussions on causation and consciousness by offering a non-emergentist alternative. As presented, however, the absence of any mathematical implementation or derivation limits the work to a high-level conceptual sketch without advancing testable claims or resolving existing inconsistencies in the literature.

major comments (2)
  1. [Dual-Laws Model proposal] The section proposing the Dual-Laws Model states that the model features distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels together with an asymmetric cause-effect relation for transmitting higher-level causes downward, yet supplies neither the functional form of those laws, the coupling term implementing inter-level transmission, nor any derivation demonstrating that the mechanism is necessary and sufficient for functional consciousness. This omission is load-bearing for the central claim.
  2. [Discussion of causal conditions for consciousness] The argument that internal causal mechanisms (rather than emergent phenomena) generate consciousness is presented as following from the DLM, but the manuscript defines the relevant causal conditions in terms of the very mechanisms the model is introduced to describe, without an independent criterion or consistency check. This renders the necessity claim circular.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Note on phenomenological aspect] The distinction between 'functional consciousness' and phenomenological aspects is noted but left undefined; a brief operational characterization would help readers evaluate the scope of the claims.
  2. [Introduction of asymmetric relation] Several key terms (e.g., 'asymmetric relation between cause and effect,' 'transmission of higher-level causes') are introduced without reference to prior formal treatments in the causation literature; adding one or two citations would clarify the novelty.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive comments on our manuscript. We address each major comment below and indicate where revisions will be made to strengthen the presentation of our ideas.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Dual-Laws Model proposal] The section proposing the Dual-Laws Model states that the model features distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels together with an asymmetric cause-effect relation for transmitting higher-level causes downward, yet supplies neither the functional form of those laws, the coupling term implementing inter-level transmission, nor any derivation demonstrating that the mechanism is necessary and sufficient for functional consciousness. This omission is load-bearing for the central claim.

    Authors: We agree that the Dual-Laws Model (DLM) is presented at a conceptual level without explicit functional forms or mathematical derivations in the current version of the manuscript. The paper's aim is to introduce a novel perspective on inter-level causation from the Causal Stance, proposing the DLM as a way to explicitly realize such mechanisms rather than treating them as emergent. While a complete mathematical formalization would indeed allow for simulations and stronger claims, we believe the conceptual sketch advances the discussion by outlining the necessary components (distinct laws and asymmetric relations). We will revise the manuscript to expand on the conceptual structure of the DLM, including possible qualitative descriptions of the coupling between levels, and clarify that full formalization is left for future work. This addresses the concern without altering the core proposal. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Discussion of causal conditions for consciousness] The argument that internal causal mechanisms (rather than emergent phenomena) generate consciousness is presented as following from the DLM, but the manuscript defines the relevant causal conditions in terms of the very mechanisms the model is introduced to describe, without an independent criterion or consistency check. This renders the necessity claim circular.

    Authors: We do not believe the argument is circular. The distinction between the Physical Stance and the Causal Stance, along with the proposal that consciousness is determined by internal causal mechanisms, is developed in the earlier sections of the paper independently of the DLM. The DLM is then introduced as a specific model to implement inter-level causality explicitly. To address the concern, we will revise the manuscript to more clearly delineate the general causal conditions for consciousness from the illustrative role of the DLM, ensuring that the necessity claim is supported by the logical implications of the Causal Stance rather than solely by the model details. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

Conceptual proposal with no formal derivations or self-referential reductions

full rationale

The paper distinguishes Physical and Causal Stances, argues that consciousness generation is determined by internal causal mechanisms rather than external interventions or emergent phenomena, and introduces the Dual-Laws Model to explicitly implement inter-level causality via distinct dynamical laws at each level. No equations, transmission rules, coupling terms, or quantitative derivations appear in the manuscript. The central claim is advanced as a definitional stance within the Causal Stance rather than derived from prior results, fitted data, or self-cited uniqueness theorems. Because the text supplies neither mathematical steps that could reduce to inputs by construction nor load-bearing self-citations, the derivation chain remains self-contained and non-circular under the specified patterns.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 2 axioms · 1 invented entities

Review performed on abstract only; full manuscript text was not provided in the query context, so the ledger is necessarily incomplete and provisional.

axioms (2)
  • domain assumption Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes.
    Stated in the abstract as the basis for separating the Physical Stance from the Causal Stance.
  • ad hoc to paper Inter-level causality can be implemented explicitly as a mechanism rather than treated solely as an emergent phenomenon.
    Central modeling choice introduced to ground the Dual-Laws Model.
invented entities (1)
  • Dual-Laws Model (DLM) no independent evidence
    purpose: To feature distinct dynamical laws at higher and lower levels so that inter-level causal transmission can be modeled explicitly.
    New modeling construct proposed in the abstract to realize the claimed causal conditions for consciousness.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5532 in / 1522 out tokens · 58546 ms · 2026-05-18T00:28:46.922053+00:00 · methodology

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Forward citations

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