pith. machine review for the scientific record.
sign in

arxiv: 2602.15395 · v2 · submitted 2026-02-17 · 💻 cs.CR

MEV in Binance Builder

Qin Wang , Ruiqiang Li , Guangsheng Yu , Vincent Gramoli , Shiping Chen This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-15 21:58 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords MEVBSCPBSarbitragecentralizationblock buildersprofit concentrationBNB Smart Chain
0
0 comments X

The pith

Two builders produce 87 percent of BSC blocks and capture 90 percent of MEV profits within months.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper traces MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain under its whitelisted proposer-builder separation and short block times. It shows that two builders rapidly dominate both block production and profit capture by exploiting the limited window for competition. Profits cluster in short low-hop routes on wrapped tokens and stablecoins rather than complex paths. A sympathetic reader cares because the design creates structural advantages for fast participants and reduces the contestability of MEV extraction compared with other chains.

Core claim

BSC's PBS uses only whitelisted builders and short block intervals while routing private order flow outside the public mempool. Within months these rules allow 48Club and Blockrazor to produce over 87 percent of blocks and capture 90 percent or more of MEV profits. Arbitrage activity converges on short low-hop routes over wrapped tokens and stablecoins, and block construction moves quickly toward monopoly because the short contestable window amplifies latency advantages and excludes slower builders and searchers.

What carries the argument

Whitelisted PBS combined with short block intervals, which collapses the time window available for MEV competition and favors builders with lower latency.

If this is right

  • MEV extraction on BSC becomes more centralized than on Ethereum.
  • The system grows structurally more vulnerable to censorship and fairness erosion.
  • Profits remain concentrated in short low-hop arbitrage routes over wrapped tokens and stablecoins.
  • Block construction converges toward monopoly as slower participants are excluded.
  • Private order flow further reduces the public information available for competition.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Chains adopting similar short-interval whitelisted PBS designs may experience comparable builder concentration unless they add explicit latency-equalization rules.
  • Searchers and builders without direct low-latency connections to the dominant entities would face systematic exclusion from profitable opportunities.
  • Users submitting transactions through the public mempool would see reduced opportunities for competitive inclusion as private flows dominate.
  • Longer-term monitoring could test whether the two dominant builders maintain or lose share if block intervals change.

Load-bearing premise

The observed concentration in blocks and profits stems primarily from the short block interval and whitelisted access rather than capital size or network effects.

What would settle it

Data showing sustained participation by multiple non-dominant builders with comparable profit shares over the same period would indicate the features are not the main driver of monopoly convergence.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2602.15395 by Guangsheng Yu, Qin Wang, Ruiqiang Li, Shiping Chen, Vincent Gramoli.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Builder activity and market concentration on BSC. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p001_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Comparison of two PBS workflows. • Λ: deductions such as validator share-profit or gas. Algorithm 1 shows how 𝑃 is extracted from𝑇 . Algorithm 2 computes (Φ, Λ) to obtain net profit. We keep the main-text description informal and defer pseudocode to Appendix A.2. Formal path representation. An arbitrage opportunity 𝑂 ′ is represented as [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Market share distribution of Binance builders [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Profitability patterns across token types. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: MEV profit concentration by builder and token. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Proposer payouts by builder. 48Club spreads pay [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Builder efficiency by path length. Longer paths add [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_8.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Swap-path complexity by builder. Most trades use [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Centralization in MEV assets. Stablecoins and [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_10.png] view at source ↗
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: Asset flows. Most routes pass through USDT, USDC, and WBNB and settle on PancakeSwap or Uniswap V3. The data imply that BSC MEV is not merely concentrated by actor. It is also concentrated by timing, venue, and asset microstructure. Builders that control the fastest order flow and the deepest stablecoin routes repeatedly harvest the same classes of opportunities, while smaller participants are largely con… view at source ↗
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: Time scales for MEV competition. Ethereum has a [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_12.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

We study builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). BSC's Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) adopts a leaner design: only whitelisted builders can participate, blocks are produced at shorter intervals, and private order flow bypasses the public mempool. These features have long raised community concerns over centralization, which we empirically confirm by tracing the arbitrage activities of the two dominant builders from Apr. 1, 2025 to Feb. 28, 2026 (full observable activity cycle). Within months, the two leading builders, \bd{48Club} and \bd{Blockrazor}, produced over 87\% of blocks and captured about 90\%+ of MEV profits. We find that profits concentrate in short, low-hop arbitrage routes over wrapped tokens and stablecoins, and that block construction rapidly converges toward monopoly. Beyond concentration alone, our analysis reveals a structural source of inequality: BSC's short block interval and whitelisted PBS collapse the contestable window for MEV competition, amplifying latency advantages and excluding slower builders and searchers. MEV extraction on BSC is not only more centralized than on Ethereum, but also structurally more vulnerable to censorship and fairness erosion.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper empirically studies builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC) under its whitelisted PBS design with short block intervals and private order flow. Tracing observable activity from April 1, 2025 to February 28, 2026, it reports that two builders (48Club and Blockrazor) produced over 87% of blocks and captured 90%+ of MEV profits, with profits concentrated in short low-hop routes on wrapped tokens and stablecoins. It concludes that the design collapses the contestable window, amplifying latency advantages and making BSC MEV structurally more centralized and vulnerable to censorship than on Ethereum.

Significance. If the concentration figures and causal attribution hold after methodological clarification, the result would document a concrete instance of PBS parameter choices (short intervals plus whitelisting) producing rapid builder monopoly, offering a useful contrast to Ethereum's more competitive builder market and supplying falsifiable evidence on how latency and access rules affect MEV fairness.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the headline claims of >87% block production and >90% MEV profit capture by 48Club and Blockrazor are presented without any description of data sources (block explorers, RPC endpoints, or on-chain tracing methods), transaction filtering rules used to identify arbitrage, or statistical error bars. This omission is load-bearing for the central empirical claim because the abstract supplies no information on how the 'full observable activity cycle' was delimited or validated.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: the structural claim that short block intervals and whitelisted PBS 'collapse the contestable window' and exclude slower builders rests on observed concentration alone; no regression, latency distribution analysis, builder participation time series, or counterfactual comparison is described that would isolate these design features from unmeasured confounders such as capital advantages, validator relationships, or first-mover effects.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the notation 'about 90%+' is imprecise; reporting exact percentages with the underlying counts or confidence intervals would improve clarity.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: the formatting command 'bd{48Club}' appears to be a LaTeX artifact and should be rendered consistently as plain text or proper emphasis.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive comments, which have helped clarify the presentation of our empirical claims. We address each major comment below. Revisions have been made to the abstract and a new discussion subsection has been added to address methodological transparency and potential confounders.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the headline claims of >87% block production and >90% MEV profit capture by 48Club and Blockrazor are presented without any description of data sources (block explorers, RPC endpoints, or on-chain tracing methods), transaction filtering rules used to identify arbitrage, or statistical error bars. This omission is load-bearing for the central empirical claim because the abstract supplies no information on how the 'full observable activity cycle' was delimited or validated.

    Authors: We agree that the abstract should include brief methodological context. The revised abstract now states that data are sourced from public BSC block explorers and RPC endpoints, with arbitrage identified via on-chain tracing of DEX swap transactions on wrapped tokens and stablecoins. The full observable activity cycle covers all traceable blocks from April 1, 2025 to February 28, 2026. Detailed filtering rules, validation steps, and statistical error bars appear in Section 3 and the appendix. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the structural claim that short block intervals and whitelisted PBS 'collapse the contestable window' and exclude slower builders rests on observed concentration alone; no regression, latency distribution analysis, builder participation time series, or counterfactual comparison is described that would isolate these design features from unmeasured confounders such as capital advantages, validator relationships, or first-mover effects.

    Authors: The manuscript already includes time-series plots of builder participation shares and MEV profit concentration that document rapid convergence to the two-builder outcome within the first months of the sample. These patterns align with the known constraints of 3-second block intervals and whitelisting, which limit the window for slower participants. We have added a dedicated discussion subsection addressing alternative explanations (capital advantages, validator relationships, first-mover effects) and have clarified that the evidence is observational rather than based on formal regressions or counterfactuals, as constructing the latter would require unavailable data on excluded builders. Causal language has been moderated accordingly. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: empirical tracing of observed block and profit shares

full rationale

The paper reports direct measurements of builder block production shares (>87%) and MEV profit capture (>90%) obtained by tracing observable on-chain activity over a fixed interval. No equations, fitted parameters, predictions, or first-principles derivations appear in the provided text. The concentration figures are presented as raw empirical outcomes rather than outputs of any model that could reduce to its own inputs. The subsequent interpretive claim linking concentration to short block intervals and whitelisted PBS is offered as an explanation of the observed data, not as a mathematical derivation that presupposes the result. No self-citations, ansatzes, or uniqueness theorems are invoked in a load-bearing way. The analysis is therefore self-contained against external benchmarks and receives the default non-circularity finding.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

Empirical measurement paper; no mathematical model, free parameters, or new entities are introduced.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5515 in / 938 out tokens · 19335 ms · 2026-05-15T21:58:14.303798+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. The Cognitive Penalty: Ablating System 1 and System 2 Reasoning in Edge-Native SLMs for Decentralized Consensus

    cs.AI 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 5.0

    System 1 intuition in edge SLMs delivers 100% adversarial robustness and low latency for DAO consensus while System 2 reasoning causes 26.7% cognitive collapse and 17x slowdown.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

67 extracted references · 67 canonical work pages · cited by 1 Pith paper

  1. [1]

    Flash boys 2.0: Fron- trunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability

    Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, and Ari Juels. Flash boys 2.0: Fron- trunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability. InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

    work page

  2. [2]

    Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 198–214, 2022

    Kaihua Qin, Liyi Zhou, and Arthur Gervais. Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 198–214, 2022

    work page 2022

  3. [3]

    Sok: Decentralized finance (DeFi) attacks.IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2023

    Liyi Zhou, Xihan Xiong, Jens Ernstberger, Stefanos Chaliasos, Zhipeng Wang, Ye Wang, Kaihua Qin, Roger Wattenhofer, Dawn Song, and Arthur Gervais. Sok: Decentralized finance (DeFi) attacks.IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2023

    work page 2023

  4. [4]

    Sok: Preventing transaction reordering manipulations in decentralized finance

    Lioba Heimbach and Roger Wattenhofer. Sok: Preventing transaction reordering manipulations in decentralized finance. InAdvances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2022

    work page 2022

  5. [5]

    Ethereum’s proposer-builder separation: Promises and realities

    Lioba Heimbach, Lucianna Kiffer, Christof Ferreira Torres, and Roger Wattenhofer. Ethereum’s proposer-builder separation: Promises and realities. InProceedings of the ACM on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), pages 406–420, 2023

    work page 2023

  6. [6]

    Ethereum proof-of-stake consensus layer: Participation and decentral- ization

    Dominic Grandjean, Lioba Heimbach, and Roger Wattenhofer. Ethereum proof-of-stake consensus layer: Participation and decentral- ization. InInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), 2024

    work page 2024

  7. [7]

    Decentralization of Ethereum’s builder market

    Sen Yang, Kartik Nayak, and Fan Zhang. Decentralization of Ethereum’s builder market. InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2025

    work page 2025

  8. [8]

    To compete or collude: Bidding incentives in Ethereum block building auctions

    Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, and Carmine Ventre. To compete or collude: Bidding incentives in Ethereum block building auctions. InProceedings of the ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2024

    work page 2024

  9. [9]

    Who wins Ethereum block building auctions and why?arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13931, 2024

    Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes. Who wins Ethereum block building auctions and why?arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13931, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  10. [10]

    Strategic bidding wars in on-chain auctions

    Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, and Carmine Ventre. Strategic bidding wars in on-chain auctions. InIEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC), pages 503–511, 2024

    work page 2024

  11. [11]

    Polygon dashboard for block time.https:// chainspect.app /chain/polygon, 2025

    Chainspec. Polygon dashboard for block time.https:// chainspect.app /chain/polygon, 2025

    work page 2025

  12. [12]

    Avalanche builder hub tool.https:// build.avax.network/, 2025

    Avalanche. Avalanche builder hub tool.https:// build.avax.network/, 2025

    work page 2025

  13. [13]

    Avalanche dashboard for block time.https:// chainspect.a pp/chain/avalanche, 2025

    Chainspec. Avalanche dashboard for block time.https:// chainspect.a pp/chain/avalanche, 2025

    work page 2025

  14. [14]

    Solana: Understanding block time.https:// docs.chain stack.com/ docs/solana-understanding-block-time, 2025

    Solana Official. Solana: Understanding block time.https:// docs.chain stack.com/ docs/solana-understanding-block-time, 2025

    work page 2025

  15. [15]

    Advancing BNB chain’s MEV landscape: Embracing proposer-builder separation (PBS) of BSC

    Binance Official. Advancing BNB chain’s MEV landscape: Embracing proposer-builder separation (PBS) of BSC. https:// www.bnbchain.org/en/ blog/advancing-bnb-chains-mev- landscape-embracing-proposer-builder-separation-pbs-of -bsc, 2023

    work page 2023

  16. [16]

    Binance Official. Unlocking the potential of MEV on BNB chain: A guide for builders and validators.https:// www.binance.com/ en- NG/square/ post/2024-06-08-unlocking-the-potential-of -mev-on- bnb-chain-a-guide-for-builders-and-validators-9201441451362, 2024

    work page 2024

  17. [17]

    BEP-322: Builder API specification for BNB Smart Chain.https:// forum.bnbchain.org/t/bep-322-builder-api-specif icatio n-for-bnb-smart-chain/ 2223, 2023

    Binance Official. BEP-322: Builder API specification for BNB Smart Chain.https:// forum.bnbchain.org/t/bep-322-builder-api-specif icatio n-for-bnb-smart-chain/ 2223, 2023

    work page 2023

  18. [18]

    BNB smart chain builder proxies

    Binance Official. BNB smart chain builder proxies. https:// docs.bnbchain.org/ bnb-smart-chain/ validator/ mev/ user- guide/ #builder-proxies, 2025

    work page 2025

  19. [19]

    BEP-126: Introduce fast finality mechanism

    BSC Team. BEP-126: Introduce fast finality mechanism. https:// forum.bnbchain.org/t/bep-126-draf t-introduce-fast-finality- mechanism/ 123, 2024

    work page 2024

  20. [20]

    BNBchain forum: Everything about fast finality.https: // forum.bnbchain.org/t/f aq-everything-about-fastfinality/ 1345, 2024

    BSC Team. BNBchain forum: Everything about fast finality.https: // forum.bnbchain.org/t/f aq-everything-about-fastfinality/ 1345, 2024

    work page 2024

  21. [21]

    Does finality gadget finalize your block? a case study of Binance consensus

    Rujia Li, Jingyuan Ding, Qin Wang, Keting Jia, Haibin Zhang, and Sisi Duan. Does finality gadget finalize your block? a case study of Binance consensus. InUSENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Sec), 2025

    work page 2025

  22. [22]

    Private order flows and builder bidding dynam- ics: The road to monopoly in Ethereum’s block building market

    Shuzheng Wang, Yue Huang, Wenqin Zhang, Yuming Huang, Xuechao Wang, and Jing Tang. Private order flows and builder bidding dynam- ics: The road to monopoly in Ethereum’s block building market. In Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference (WWW), 2025

    work page 2025

  23. [23]

    Demystifying private transactions and their impact in PoW and PoS Ethereum.arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.23510, 2025

    Xingyu Lyu, Mengya Zhang, Xiaokuan Zhang, Jianyu Niu, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin. Demystifying private transactions and their impact in PoW and PoS Ethereum.arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.23510, 2025

    work page arXiv 2025

  24. [24]

    A flash (bot) in the pan: Measuring maximal extractable value in private pools

    Ben Weintraub, Christof Ferreira Torres, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Radu State. A flash (bot) in the pan: Measuring maximal extractable value in private pools. InProceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), 2022

    work page 2022

  25. [25]

    BNB smart chain MEV stats.https:// dune.com/bnbchain/ bnb- smart-chain-mev-stats, 2025

    Dune. BNB smart chain MEV stats.https:// dune.com/bnbchain/ bnb- smart-chain-mev-stats, 2025

    work page 2025

  26. [26]

    MEV in BSC, is it still a thing?https:// forum.bnbc hain.org/t/mev-in-bsc-is-it-still-a-thing/ 3688, 2025

    cracksparrow00. MEV in BSC, is it still a thing?https:// forum.bnbc hain.org/t/mev-in-bsc-is-it-still-a-thing/ 3688, 2025

    work page 2025

  27. [27]

    Builders are engaging in MEV #3218.https:// github.c om/bnb-chain/ bsc/ issues/3218, 2025

    Tommyhom. Builders are engaging in MEV #3218.https:// github.c om/bnb-chain/ bsc/ issues/3218, 2025

    work page 2025

  28. [28]

    Quantifying the threat of sandwiching MEV on jito: A measurement of Solana’s leading validator client

    Nicole Gerzon, Ben Weintraub, Junbeom In, Alan Mislove, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru. Quantifying the threat of sandwiching MEV on jito: A measurement of Solana’s leading validator client. InProceedings of the 2025 ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), pages 937–943, 2025

    work page 2025

  29. [29]

    Measuring CEX-DEX extracted value and searcher profitability: The darkest of the MEV dark forest.Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2025

    Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai. Measuring CEX-DEX extracted value and searcher profitability: The darkest of the MEV dark forest.Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2025

    work page 2025

  30. [30]

    Rolling in the shadows: Analyzing the extraction of MEV across layer-2 rollups

    Christof Ferreira Torres, Albin Mamuti, Ben Weintraub, Cristina Nita- Rotaru, and Shweta Shinde. Rolling in the shadows: Analyzing the extraction of MEV across layer-2 rollups. InACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 2591–2605, 2024

    work page 2024

  31. [31]

    From competition to centralization: The oligopoly in Ethereum block building auctions

    Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, and Carmine Ventre. From competition to centralization: The oligopoly in Ethereum block building auctions. InEuropean Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), 2025

    work page 2025

  32. [32]

    Decentralization or favoritism? an analysis of Ethereum transactions and maximal extractable value strategies

    Davide Mancino, Alberto Leporati, Marco Viviani, and Giovanni Denaro. Decentralization or favoritism? an analysis of Ethereum transactions and maximal extractable value strategies. InIEEE Inter- national Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC), pages 1–9, 2025

    work page 2025

  33. [33]

    MEV capture and decentralization in execution tickets.arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.11255, 2024

    Jonah Burian, Davide Crapis, and Fahad Saleh. MEV capture and decentralization in execution tickets.arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.11255, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  34. [34]

    Central- ization in block-building and proposer-builder separation

    Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden. Central- ization in block-building and proposer-builder separation. InInterna- tional Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), pages 331–349. Springer, 2024. 14 MEV in Binance Builder

    work page 2024

  35. [35]

    The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation

    Tivas Gupta, Mallesh M Pai, and Max Resnick. The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation. In5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2023

    work page 2023

  36. [36]

    Searcher competition in block building

    Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Benny Sudakov. Searcher competition in block building. In6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2024

    work page 2024

  37. [37]

    Optimistic MEV in Ethereum layer 2s: Why blockspace is always in demand.Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2025

    Ozan Solmaz, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wat- tenhofer. Optimistic MEV in Ethereum layer 2s: Why blockspace is always in demand.Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2025

    work page 2025

  38. [38]

    High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges

    Liyi Zhou, Kaihua Qin, Christof Ferreira Torres, Duc V Le, and Arthur Gervais. High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges. InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 428–445. IEEE, 2021

    work page 2021

  39. [39]

    Sok: Oracles from the ground truth to market manipulation

    Shayan Eskandari, Mehdi Salehi, Wanyun Catherine Gu, and Jeremy Clark. Sok: Oracles from the ground truth to market manipulation. In ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), pages 127–141, 2021

    work page 2021

  40. [40]

    A first dive into OFAC in DeFi space

    Qin Wang, Shange Fu, Shiping Chen, and Jiangshan Yu. A first dive into OFAC in DeFi space. InInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). Springer, 2023

    work page 2023

  41. [41]

    Global trends in cryptocurrency regu- lation: An overview

    Xihan Xiong and Junliang Luo. Global trends in cryptocurrency regu- lation: An overview. InThe International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE), pages 71–92. Springer, 2024

    work page 2024

  42. [42]

    AUCIL: An inclusion list design for rational parties.Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2025

    Sarisht Wadhwa, Julian Ma, Thomas Thiery, Barnabe Monnot, Luca Zanolini, Fan Zhang, and Kartik Nayak. AUCIL: An inclusion list design for rational parties.Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2025

    work page 2025

  43. [43]

    Breaking the privacy barrier: On the fea- sibility of reorganization attacks on Ethereum private transactions

    Mengya Zhang, Xingyu Lyu, Jianyu Niu, Xiaokuan Zhang, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin. Breaking the privacy barrier: On the fea- sibility of reorganization attacks on Ethereum private transactions. InAnnual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pages 439–455, 2024

    work page 2024

  44. [44]

    Explor- ing unfairness on proof of authority: Order manipulation attacks and remedies

    Qin Wang, Rujia Li, Qi Wang, Shiping Chen, and Yang Xiang. Explor- ing unfairness on proof of authority: Order manipulation attacks and remedies. InACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communica- tions Security (AsiaCCS), 2022

    work page 2022

  45. [45]

    Front-running attack in sharded blockchains and fair cross-shard consensus

    Jianting Zhang, Wuhui Chen, Sifu Luo, Tiantian Gong, Zicong Hong, and Aniket Kate. Front-running attack in sharded blockchains and fair cross-shard consensus. InNetwork and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium, 2024

    work page 2024

  46. [46]

    No fish is too big for flash boys! frontrunning on DAG-based blockchains

    Jianting Zhang and Aniket Kate. No fish is too big for flash boys! frontrunning on DAG-based blockchains. InAnnual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2025

    work page 2025

  47. [47]

    Non-atomic arbitrage in decentralized finance

    Lioba Heimbach, Vabuk Pahari, and Eric Schertenleib. Non-atomic arbitrage in decentralized finance. InIEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2024

    work page 2024

  48. [48]

    Cross-chain arbitrage: The next frontier of MEV in decentralized finance.Proceed- ings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, 9(3), 2025

    Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel, Bruno Ma- zorra, Jonas Gebele, Filip Rezabek, and Florian Matthes. Cross-chain arbitrage: The next frontier of MEV in decentralized finance.Proceed- ings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, 9(3), 2025

    work page 2025

  49. [49]

    Cross-rollup MEV: Non-atomic arbitrage across L2 blockchains.arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.02172, 2024

    Krzysztof Gogol, Johnnatan Messias, Deborah Miori, Claudio Tessone, and Benjamin Livshits. Cross-rollup MEV: Non-atomic arbitrage across L2 blockchains.arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.02172, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  50. [50]

    Time moves faster when there is nothing you anticipate: The role of time in MEV rewards

    Burak Öz, Benjamin Kraner, Nicolò Vallarano, Bingle Stegmann Kruger, Florian Matthes, and Claudio Juan Tessone. Time moves faster when there is nothing you anticipate: The role of time in MEV rewards. InProceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (DeFi@CCS), pages 1–8, 2023

    work page 2023

  51. [51]

    MEV capture through time-advantaged arbitrage.arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.10797, 2024

    Robin Fritsch, Maria Inês Silva, Akaki Mamageishvili, Benjamin Livshits, and Edward W Felten. MEV capture through time-advantaged arbitrage.arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.10797, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  52. [52]

    Time is money: Strategic timing games in proof-of-stake protocols

    Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, Fahad Saleh, Thomas Thiery, Jennifer Pan, Nihar Shah, and Barnabé Monnot. Time is money: Strategic timing games in proof-of-stake protocols. In5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), 2023

    work page 2023

  53. [53]

    Sok: Mitigation of front-running in decentralized finance

    Carsten Baum, James Hsin-yu Chiang, Bernardo David, Tore Kasper Frederiksen, and Lorenzo Gentile. Sok: Mitigation of front-running in decentralized finance. InInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), pages 250–271. Springer, 2022

    work page 2022

  54. [54]

    Sok: MEV countermeasures

    Sen Yang, Fan Zhang, Ken Huang, Xi Chen, Youwei Yang, and Feng Zhu. Sok: MEV countermeasures. InProceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (DeFi@CCS), pages 21–30, 2024

    work page 2024

  55. [55]

    Blockchain transaction censorship:(in) secure and (in) efficient? InThe Interna- tional Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE)

    Zhipeng Wang, Xihan Xiong, and William J Knottenbelt. Blockchain transaction censorship:(in) secure and (in) efficient? InThe Interna- tional Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE). Springer, 2023

    work page 2023

  56. [56]

    Blockchain censorship

    Anton Wahrstätter, Jens Ernstberger, Aviv Yaish, Liyi Zhou, Kaihua Qin, Taro Tsuchiya, Sebastian Steinhorst, Davor Svetinovic, Nicolas Christin, Mikolaj Barczentewicz, et al. Blockchain censorship. In Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference (WWW), pages 1632–1643, 2024

    work page 2024

  57. [57]

    AOAB: Optimal and fair ordering of financial transactions

    Vincent Gramoli, Zhenliang Lu, Qiang Tang, and Pouriya Zarbafian. AOAB: Optimal and fair ordering of financial transactions. InAnnual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), pages 377–388, 2024

    work page 2024

  58. [58]

    Mitigating front-running attacks through fair and resilient transaction dissemination

    Wassim Yahyaoui, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Jérémie Decouchant, and Marcus Völp. Mitigating front-running attacks through fair and resilient transaction dissemination. InAnnual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2025

    work page 2025

  59. [59]

    Quick order fairness

    Christian Cachin, Jovana Mićić, Nathalie Steinhauer, and Luca Zano- lini. Quick order fairness. InInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), pages 316–333. Springer, 2022

    work page 2022

  60. [60]

    Byzantine ordered consensus without byzantine oligarchy

    Yunhao Zhang, Srinath Setty, Qi Chen, Lidong Zhou, and Lorenzo Alvisi. Byzantine ordered consensus without byzantine oligarchy. In USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), pages 633–649, 2020

    work page 2020

  61. [61]

    Themis: Fast, strong order-fairness in byzantine consensus

    Mahimna Kelkar, Soubhik Deb, Sishan Long, Ari Juels, and Sreeram Kannan. Themis: Fast, strong order-fairness in byzantine consensus. InACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2023

    work page 2023

  62. [62]

    Transaction fairness in blockchains, revisited.IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2025

    Rujia Li, Xuanwei Hu, Qin Wang, Sisi Duan, and Qi Wang. Transaction fairness in blockchains, revisited.IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2025

    work page 2025

  63. [63]

    PROF: Protected order flow in a profit-seeking world.arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.02303, 2024

    Kushal Babel, Nerla Jean-Louis, Yan Ji, Ujval Misra, Mahimna Kelkar, Kosala Yapa Mudiyanselage, Andrew Miller, and Ari Juels. PROF: Protected order flow in a profit-seeking world.arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.02303, 2024

    work page arXiv 2024

  64. [64]

    Aion: secure transaction ordering using TEEs

    Pouriya Zarbafian and Vincent Gramoli. Aion: secure transaction ordering using TEEs. InEuropean Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), pages 332–350. Springer, 2023

    work page 2023

  65. [65]

    Maximal extractable value in batch auctions

    Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li, Xinyuan Sun, Elynn Chen, and Xi Chen. Maximal extractable value in batch auctions. InProceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2025

    work page 2025

  66. [66]

    RediSwap: MEV redis- tribution mechanism for CFMMs

    Mengqian Zhang, Sen Yang, and Fan Zhang. RediSwap: MEV redis- tribution mechanism for CFMMs. InProceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (DeFi), 2025

    work page 2025

  67. [67]

    Unknown/Other

    Massimo Bartoletti and Roberto Zunino. A theoretical basis for MEV. InInternational Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Secu- rity (FC), 2025. 15 1,3Qin Wang, 2Ruiqiang Li, 3Guangsheng Yu, 4Vincent Gramoli, 1Shiping Chen A Preparing Data This appendix expands the data collection and processing steps. We cover raw trace acquisition, builder-contr...

    work page 2025