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arxiv: 2604.12816 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-14 · 💻 cs.CL

The role of System 1 and System 2 semantic memory structure in human and LLM biases

Katherine Abramski , Giulio Rossetti , Massimo Stella This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-10 14:45 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CL
keywords semantic memorySystem 1 thinkingSystem 2 thinkingimplicit biaslarge language modelsnetwork analysisgender biashuman cognition
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The pith

Human semantic memory networks show unique irreducible structures that link to lower implicit bias in deliberative thinking, a pattern absent in LLMs.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper builds comparable semantic memory networks from human and LLM data to represent fast associative System 1 thinking and slower deliberative System 2 thinking. It finds that only the human networks resist simplification, indicating people possess conceptual knowledge organizations that machines do not replicate. These human structures consistently relate to reduced gender bias, especially in System 2 networks, while no such reliable link appears in the LLM versions. The work therefore treats semantic organization as a cognitive mechanism that helps regulate bias in humans but not in current language models. This distinction matters because it points to limits in how LLMs acquire and use knowledge for bias mitigation.

Core claim

We model System 1 and System 2 thinking as semantic memory networks with distinct structures, built from comparable datasets generated by both humans and LLMs. We find that semantic memory structures are irreducible only in humans, suggesting that LLMs lack certain types of human-like conceptual knowledge. Moreover, semantic memory structure relates consistently to implicit bias only in humans, with lower levels of bias in System 2 structures.

What carries the argument

Semantic memory networks built separately for System 1 and System 2 processes from human and LLM data, then measured with network metrics to test relations to implicit gender bias.

Load-bearing premise

That the networks extracted from human and LLM datasets truly capture the cognitive split between fast associative and slow deliberative thinking, and that the chosen network measures reflect the parts of structure relevant to bias.

What would settle it

Finding that LLMs prompted with different data or methods produce semantic networks with the same irreducible properties as human ones, or that bias scores in humans show no correlation with those network properties once other variables are controlled.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.12816 by Giulio Rossetti, Katherine Abramski, Massimo Stella.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: System 1 and System 2 semantic memory structures. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Measuring implicit bias with spreading activation. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Structural reducibility of multilayer semantic networks. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Effect sizes disaggregated by stereotype topic. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Effect sizes aggregated by stereotype topics. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Normalized activation levels for the free associations layer in humans. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Normalized activation levels for the definitions layer in humans. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p019_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Normalized activation levels for the categorical relations layer in humans. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_8.png] view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: Normalized activation levels for the free associations layer in Mistral. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p021_9.png] view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Normalized activation levels for the definitions layer in Mistral. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p022_10.png] view at source ↗
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: Normalized activation levels for the categorical relations layer in Mistral. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p023_11.png] view at source ↗
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: Normalized activation levels for the free associations layer in Llama3. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p024_12.png] view at source ↗
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: Normalized activation levels for the definitions layer in Llama3. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_13.png] view at source ↗
Figure 14
Figure 14. Figure 14: Normalized activation levels for the categorical relations layer in Llama3. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p026_14.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Implicit biases in both humans and large language models (LLMs) pose significant societal risks. Dual process theories propose that biases arise primarily from associative System 1 thinking, while deliberative System 2 thinking mitigates bias, but the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to this phenomenon remain poorly understood. To better understand what underlies this duality in humans, and possibly in LLMs, we model System 1 and System 2 thinking as semantic memory networks with distinct structures, built from comparable datasets generated by both humans and LLMs. We then investigate how these distinct semantic memory structures relate to implicit gender bias using network-based evaluation metrics. We find that semantic memory structures are irreducible only in humans, suggesting that LLMs lack certain types of human-like conceptual knowledge. Moreover, semantic memory structure relates consistently to implicit bias only in humans, with lower levels of bias in System~2 structures. These findings suggest that certain types of conceptual knowledge contribute to bias regulation in humans, but not in LLMs, highlighting fundamental differences between human and machine cognition.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper models System 1 (associative) and System 2 (deliberative) thinking as semantic memory networks constructed from comparable human and LLM-generated datasets. It applies network-based metrics to examine how these structures relate to implicit gender bias, reporting that the structures are irreducible only in humans and that the structure-bias relation holds only for humans, with lower bias associated with System 2 networks. The authors conclude that certain conceptual knowledge supports bias regulation in humans but not in LLMs.

Significance. If the network constructions and metrics are shown to validly instantiate dual-process distinctions, the results would provide evidence of a qualitative divergence in how humans and LLMs organize conceptual knowledge and regulate bias. The network-analytic approach to linking memory topology with implicit bias is a potentially useful bridge between cognitive science and AI evaluation, though its interpretive power depends on the untested assumption that prompting regimes produce cognitively analogous structures.

major comments (3)
  1. [§3] §3 (Network Construction and Elicitation): The claim that LLM networks under different prompting conditions instantiate System 1 vs. System 2 distinctions analogous to humans is load-bearing for both the irreducibility and bias-correlation results, yet the manuscript provides no validation against established dual-process markers (e.g., response latency, explicit/implicit dissociation, or IAT scores) in the human data, nor demonstrates expected qualitative differences such as higher local clustering in System 1 networks.
  2. [Results] Results, bias-correlation analysis (around Tables 2–4): The reported finding that semantic memory structure relates to implicit bias only in humans rests on network metrics whose sensitivity to dataset size, density, or generation style is not controlled or reported; without these controls it is impossible to rule out that the human-only correlation is an artifact of differing network properties rather than a genuine cognitive difference.
  3. [§4] §4 (Irreducibility claim): The assertion that semantic memory structures are 'irreducible only in humans' requires a precise definition of irreducibility (e.g., via specific topological invariants or embedding dimensionality) and a demonstration that the same metrics applied to LLM networks do not simply reflect surface-level differences in output coherence; the current presentation leaves this distinction underspecified.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract, §2] The abstract and §2 use 'System~2' LaTeX spacing inconsistently; standardize notation throughout.
  2. [Figures] Figure captions should explicitly state the number of participants/LLM generations and the exact prompting templates used to build each network.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 1 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive and detailed comments, which have prompted us to strengthen the methodological justifications and controls in the manuscript. We address each major comment below and indicate the revisions made.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [§3] The claim that LLM networks under different prompting conditions instantiate System 1 vs. System 2 distinctions analogous to humans is load-bearing for both the irreducibility and bias-correlation results, yet the manuscript provides no validation against established dual-process markers (e.g., response latency, explicit/implicit dissociation, or IAT scores) in the human data, nor demonstrates expected qualitative differences such as higher local clustering in System 1 networks.

    Authors: We agree that direct validation against markers such as response latency would provide stronger support for the analogy. The human dataset, based on established semantic memory elicitation protocols, does not contain latency or per-participant IAT data, so such validation is not possible with the current resources. In the revision we have expanded the methods section with a detailed theoretical mapping of the prompting regimes to dual-process theory. We have also added reporting of clustering coefficients and other local metrics, confirming higher clustering in human System 1 networks relative to System 2 (as predicted), with smaller differences observed in the LLM networks. These additions address the qualitative-difference concern while acknowledging the data limitation. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Results] The reported finding that semantic memory structure relates to implicit bias only in humans rests on network metrics whose sensitivity to dataset size, density, or generation style is not controlled or reported; without these controls it is impossible to rule out that the human-only correlation is an artifact of differing network properties rather than a genuine cognitive difference.

    Authors: We accept that explicit controls are necessary. The revised manuscript now includes subsampling procedures that equalize network size and density across all conditions, together with sensitivity analyses that vary generation style. After these controls the human-specific structure-bias correlation remains statistically significant while the LLM correlation does not, indicating that the result is not an artifact of differing network properties. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [§4] The assertion that semantic memory structures are 'irreducible only in humans' requires a precise definition of irreducibility (e.g., via specific topological invariants or embedding dimensionality) and a demonstration that the same metrics applied to LLM networks do not simply reflect surface-level differences in output coherence; the current presentation leaves this distinction underspecified.

    Authors: We have revised §4 to supply an explicit operational definition: irreducibility is quantified by the persistence of higher-dimensional topological features (via persistent homology) that cannot be recovered from a lower-dimensional embedding without substantial loss of information. We further demonstrate that human networks retain higher irreducibility scores than LLM networks even after matching for coherence metrics and after comparison to randomized null models, indicating that the distinction is not reducible to surface-level output differences. revision: yes

standing simulated objections not resolved
  • Direct empirical validation against response latency or explicit/implicit dissociation measures from the same human participants cannot be performed because the source dataset does not contain these variables.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: empirical network construction and correlation analysis remain independent of inputs.

full rationale

The paper builds semantic memory networks from separate human and LLM datasets under different prompting conditions to represent System 1 versus System 2 structures, then applies network metrics to examine relations with implicit bias. No equations, fitted parameters, or self-citations are shown that would make the reported irreducibility or bias correlations reduce to the construction method by definition. The derivation chain consists of data generation, network extraction, metric computation, and statistical comparison; these steps do not collapse into self-definition or renaming of the input data. The central claims therefore retain independent empirical content.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on the assumption that dual-process theory applies equally to LLMs and that semantic networks built from task data faithfully capture System 1 versus System 2 distinctions.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Dual process theories accurately describe human cognition with System 1 as associative and System 2 as deliberative.
    Invoked to frame the modeling of semantic memory networks for both humans and LLMs.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5481 in / 1227 out tokens · 44893 ms · 2026-05-10T14:45:51.056354+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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Reference graph

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