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arxiv: 2605.23429 · v3 · pith:4AF57HZ3new · submitted 2026-05-22 · 📡 eess.SP · cs.CR

Communication Security and Sensing Privacy in FMCW-Based ISAC Through Signal Modulation

Murat Temiz , Christos Masouros This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-06-30 15:18 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 📡 eess.SP cs.CR
keywords ISACFMCWphysical layer securitysensing privacyindex modulationphase codingambiguity functionradar-centric signaling
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The pith

Index modulation and phase coding on FMCW chirps secure data and prevent unauthorized velocity sensing in ISAC.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper establishes a signaling design for integrated sensing and communication that uses index modulation to secure data transmission and phase coding to enhance sensing privacy. The phase coding is designed to perturb the ambiguity function of the FMCW signal, making velocity estimation infeasible for passive eavesdroppers and impairing range estimation. This approach maintains high data throughput according to simulations. A reader cares because it offers physical layer protection for both communication and sensing functions without apparent performance loss.

Core claim

The proposed radar-centric design employs index modulation over FMCW chirps for an outer layer of data security and explicitly designs phase coding to perturb the resulting signal's ambiguity function, thereby rendering target velocity estimation practically infeasible for unauthorized passive sensing hardware and significantly impairing its range estimation capabilities.

What carries the argument

Phase coding designed to perturb the ambiguity function of the FMCW signal, used together with index modulation.

If this is right

  • The proposed modulation achieves high data throughput while enhancing communication security.
  • Unauthorized passive sensing cannot reliably perform velocity estimation.
  • Range estimation by unauthorized hardware is significantly impaired.
  • Legitimate sensing hardware can still perform its functions with the known coding.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • This method might allow ISAC systems to operate in environments where passive surveillance is a concern without additional encryption layers.
  • Similar phase perturbation techniques could be explored for other continuous wave radar types.
  • Testing against advanced eavesdroppers with partial code knowledge would be a natural next step.

Load-bearing premise

The phase coding scheme perturbs the ambiguity function in a manner that cannot be reversed or compensated by a sensing eavesdropper who lacks knowledge of the specific coding sequence.

What would settle it

Demonstration that a passive receiver without knowledge of the phase coding sequence can accurately estimate target velocity from the received signal.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.23429 by Christos Masouros, Murat Temiz.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: A typical ISAC scenario, where the ISAC transceiver transmits ISAC signals to communicate with the CU and perform sensing using the same signals. Meanwhile, the S-Eve aims to exploit the ISAC signals for unauthorized sensing, and the C-Eve attempts to eavesdrop on the communication. obtained through passive sensing, which may include target classification and recognition [18]. Various methods have been rec… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: The proposed ISAC transceiver that transmits ISAC signals for communications and sensing, and receives and [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Transmission of Sec-FMCW signaling, including pilot chirps for channel estimation (CE). [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Illustration of IM-PC-FMCW chirps in the fre [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: depicts the AFs of the optimized Sec-FMCW signal for sensing privacy in comparison with the FMCW and IM-PC-FMCW signals. As seen in this figure, the Sec￾FMCW has sidelobes in the desired locations of the AF, which are much higher than the sidelobes of the random phase-coded IM-PC-FMCW chirp. In addition to the data transmitted via phase codes, the proposed Sec-FMCW signaling utilizes index modulation, whic… view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: The proposed communication receiver architecture to receive the communication data. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Maximum throughput that can be achieved by CU [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Uncompensated matched-filter range profiles ob [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_10.png] view at source ↗
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: The PSL and ISL versus throughput in relation [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_11.png] view at source ↗
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: Range-velocity maps obtained by ISAC sensing receiver and S-Eve, SNR = 20 dB. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_12.png] view at source ↗
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: Mean range and velocity errors of the target [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_13.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

This study proposes a novel radar-centric signaling design and architecture for secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) systems. The proposed framework is designed to provide robust physical layer security for data transmission while simultaneously enhancing sensing privacy. It employs index modulation and phase coding over frequency-modulated continuous-wave radar (FMCW) chirps, where index modulation (IM) provides an outer layer of data security, and we explicitly design the phase coding (PC) to perturb the resulting signal's ambiguity function (AF) to enhance sensing privacy. This design reduces the risk of unauthorized surveillance by rendering target velocity estimation practically infeasible for unauthorized passive sensing hardware (i.e., a sensing eavesdropper, S-Eve) and significantly impairing its range estimation capabilities. Furthermore, this study also presents the transmitter and receiver architectures required for effective modulation and demodulation of the proposed ISAC signaling and for performing sensing at the legitimate sensing hardware. Simulation results show that the proposed approach achieves high data throughput while enhancing communication security and sensing privacy.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper proposes a radar-centric ISAC signaling scheme that combines index modulation (IM) for data security with a designed phase coding (PC) over FMCW chirps. The PC is constructed to perturb the ambiguity function such that an unauthorized passive sensing eavesdropper (S-Eve) lacking the code cannot recover target velocity and suffers impaired range estimation, while the legitimate receiver (who knows the code) performs sensing and demodulation normally. Simulation results are asserted to demonstrate high throughput alongside the claimed security and privacy gains.

Significance. If the privacy mechanism proves robust against realistic eavesdroppers, the approach would offer a low-overhead physical-layer method to simultaneously secure communications and limit unauthorized sensing in ISAC systems, addressing a growing concern in shared-spectrum radar-communication deployments.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract (and implied § on sensing privacy): the claim that velocity estimation is 'practically infeasible' for S-Eve rests on the unexamined assumption that no blind compensation, joint code-and-target estimation, or multi-chirp averaging can recover the perturbation. No analysis or simulation of these countermeasures is provided, which is load-bearing for the privacy result.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: simulation results are invoked to support both throughput and privacy claims, yet no parameters (chirp count, SNR range, target models, baseline comparisons, or error bars) are stated, preventing verification that the reported gains are not artifacts of the chosen scenario.
minor comments (1)
  1. The manuscript should clarify whether the phase code is fixed per frame or varies, and how this choice affects both legitimate sensing performance and the eavesdropper's ability to estimate the sequence.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive comments. We address the major concerns regarding the privacy claims and simulation details point by point below.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract (and implied § on sensing privacy): the claim that velocity estimation is 'practically infeasible' for S-Eve rests on the unexamined assumption that no blind compensation, joint code-and-target estimation, or multi-chirp averaging can recover the perturbation. No analysis or simulation of these countermeasures is provided, which is load-bearing for the privacy result.

    Authors: We agree that a more thorough examination of potential countermeasures would strengthen the sensing privacy claims. The phase coding is specifically designed to make the ambiguity function dependent on the secret code, which in principle requires the code for accurate compensation. However, to address this, in the revised manuscript we will add analysis and simulations considering multi-chirp averaging and simple blind compensation attempts by the S-Eve, demonstrating that velocity estimation remains significantly degraded even under these scenarios. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: simulation results are invoked to support both throughput and privacy claims, yet no parameters (chirp count, SNR range, target models, baseline comparisons, or error bars) are stated, preventing verification that the reported gains are not artifacts of the chosen scenario.

    Authors: The detailed simulation parameters, including the number of chirps (e.g., 64), SNR ranges from -10 to 20 dB, single-target models with specific velocities and ranges, comparisons to baseline FMCW without PC, and error bars from Monte Carlo runs, are provided in Section IV of the full manuscript. To make the abstract self-contained, we will revise it to briefly mention key parameters such as the chirp count and SNR conditions. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: privacy claim follows by construction from secret phase coding design

full rationale

The paper presents an explicit signaling construction (index modulation plus designed phase coding on FMCW chirps) whose effect on the ambiguity function is stated as a deliberate design choice that withholds the code from the eavesdropper. No equations, fitted parameters, or self-citations are shown reducing the 'practically infeasible' velocity claim to a quantity defined by the same inputs; the architecture is forward-designed and simulation-validated rather than derived from a loop. The central premise therefore remains independent of the patterns that would trigger circularity scores.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

The abstract supplies no explicit free parameters, axioms, or invented entities; the design is described at the level of modulation choices and their intended effect on the ambiguity function.

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