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arxiv: quant-ph/0404085 · v1 · submitted 2004-04-14 · 🪐 quant-ph

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Eavesdropping on the Bostroem-Filbinger Communication Protocol in Noisy Quantum Channel

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classification 🪐 quant-ph
keywords protocolquantumchannelcommunicationnoisyping-pongattackeavesdropping
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We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostr\UNICODE{0xf6}m-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice's information instead of a most general quantum operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection probability $d$ should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.

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