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A Simple Semantics and Static Analysis for Stack Inspection

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Paper breakdownThe authors' claims, conditions and measurements, as JSON Signed receiptProof this review has not been altered
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Anindya Banerjee, David A. Naumann

Programming Languages · Submitted 20 Sep 2013

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals.

how it is stated · asserted 1.00 read the record →

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arXiv ID1309.5144 (version 1)
Pith IDBPOAFOMU, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationAnindya Banerjee, David A. Naumann. "A Simple Semantics and Static Analysis for Stack Inspection." arXiv:1309.5144 (2013). https://pith.science/paper/BPOAFOMU
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The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

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Compiled by classifier-1.13-20260917 via OpenRouter, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 4,175 input tokens, $0.0002 reported.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.06 · states limitation 0.07 · human participants 0.02 · controlled comparison 0.07 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.04 · compares with prior results 0.89 · mentions code or data availability 0.03.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. background 1.00 0.04 0.03 asserted 1.00
s1 We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. contribution 0.80 0.96 0.19 asserted 1.00
s2 We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. contribution 0.98 0.96 0.25 asserted 1.00
s3 We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. contribution 0.97 0.94 0.14 asserted 0.98
s4 We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics. contribution 0.81 0.96 0.24 asserted 1.00

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 0.74 · evidence from proof or derivation 1.00.

What was examined, and what was not

sources read
  • arXiv listing abstract v1
not examined
  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
  • relations to other papers
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  • P abstract
not run
  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics.

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