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The nucleolus of large majority games

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arxiv 1310.0004 v3 pith:AEFDRVQR submitted 2013-09-30 math.OC

Sascha Kurz , Stefan Napel , Andreas Nohn This is my paper · ORCID
classification math.OC
keywords nucleolusmajoritypowervotingweightbecomebehaviorcase
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Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal; and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small.

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