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Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic

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arxiv 1401.5577 v2 pith:NI7L7PNK submitted 2014-01-22 cs.GT cs.LO

Mihaly Barasz , Paul Christiano , Benja Fallenstein , Marcello Herreshoff , Patrick LaVictoire , Eliezer Yudkowsky This is my paper
classification cs.GTcs.LO
keywords agentscooperationdilemmalogicmodalprisonerprovabilityrobust
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We consider the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma between algorithms with read-access to one anothers' source codes, and we use the modal logic of provability to build agents that can achieve mutual cooperation in a manner that is robust, in that cooperation does not require exact equality of the agents' source code, and unexploitable, meaning that such an agent never cooperates when its opponent defects. We construct a general framework for such "modal agents", and study their properties.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. OpenAlex reports about 17 citations worldwide. Full citation record

  1. A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inference

    cs.AI 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Foundation-model agents that plan by predicting both the world and themselves can rationally cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas by inferring behavioral similarity from interaction history.

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