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Rational coordination with no communication or conventions
Multiagent Systems · Submitted 22 Jun 2017
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyze which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. | background 0.81 | 0.27 | 0.04 | asserted 0.99 |
| s1 | We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyze which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. | contribution 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.22 | asserted 0.99 |
| s2 | We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games. | result 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.22 | asserted 0.99 |
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The paper
Original abstract
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyze which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.
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