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Functional Decision Theory: A New Theory of Instrumental Rationality

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arxiv 1710.05060 v2 pith:P5LI5HHW submitted 2017-10-13 cs.AI

classification cs.AI
keywords decisiontheoryfunctionalproblemutilityfunctionnormativenumber
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This paper describes and motivates a new decision theory known as functional decision theory (FDT), as distinct from causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. Functional decision theorists hold that the normative principle for action is to treat one's decision as the output of a fixed mathematical function that answers the question, "Which output of this very function would yield the best outcome?" Adhering to this principle delivers a number of benefits, including the ability to maximize wealth in an array of traditional decision-theoretic and game-theoretic problems where CDT and EDT perform poorly. Using one simple and coherent decision rule, functional decision theorists (for example) achieve more utility than CDT on Newcomb's problem, more utility than EDT on the smoking lesion problem, and more utility than both in Parfit's hitchhiker problem. In this paper, we define FDT, explore its prescriptions in a number of different decision problems, compare it to CDT and EDT, and give philosophical justifications for FDT as a normative theory of decision-making.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inference

    cs.AI 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Foundation-model agents that plan by predicting both the world and themselves can rationally cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas by inferring behavioral similarity from interaction history.

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