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Distributed Rumor Blocking with Multiple Positive Cascades

Social and Information Networks · Submitted 20 Nov 2017

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim We show that the rumor blocking effect provided by the Nash equilibrium will not be arbitrarily worse even if the positive cascades are generated non-cooperatively.

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arXiv ID1711.07412 (version 2)
Pith IDDPS4BVCD, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationDing-Zhu Du, Guangmo Amo Tong, Weili Wu. "Distributed Rumor Blocking with Multiple Positive Cascades." arXiv:1711.07412 (2017). https://pith.science/paper/DPS4BVCD
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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 6,164 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.05 · states limitation 0.23 · human participants 0.03 · controlled comparison 0.14 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.11 · compares with prior results 0.20 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v2. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Misinformation and rumor can spread rapidly and widely through online social networks and therefore rumor controlling has become a critical issue. It is often assumed that there is a single authority whose goal is to minimize the spread of rumor by generating a positive cascade. In this paper, we study a more realistic scenario when there are multiple positive cascades generated by different agents. For the multiple-cascade diffusion, we propose the P2P independent cascade (PIC) model for private social communications. The main part of this paper is an analysis of the rumor blocking effect (i.e. the number of the users activated by rumor) when the agents non-cooperatively generate the positive cascades. We show that the rumor blocking effect provided by the Nash equilibrium will not be arbitrarily worse even if the positive cascades are generated non-cooperatively. In addition, we give a discussion on how the cascade priority and activation order affect the rumor blocking problem. We experimentally examine the Nash equilibrium of the proposed games by simulations done on real social network structures.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Misinformation and rumor can spread rapidly and widely through online social networks and therefore rumor controlling has become a critical issue. background 1.00 0.04 0.02 asserted 0.99
s1 It is often assumed that there is a single authority whose goal is to minimize the spread of rumor by generating a positive cascade. background 0.94 0.04 0.02 asserted 0.79
s2 In this paper, we study a more realistic scenario when there are multiple positive cascades generated by different agents. contribution 0.68 0.24 0.03 asserted 0.93
s3 For the multiple-cascade diffusion, we propose the P2P independent cascade (PIC) model for private social communications. method 0.92 0.90 0.03 asserted 0.99
s4 The main part of this paper is an analysis of the rumor blocking effect (i.e. the number of the users activated by rumor) when the agents non-cooperatively generate the positive cascades. contribution 0.97 0.76 0.09 asserted 0.76
s5 We show that the rumor blocking effect provided by the Nash equilibrium will not be arbitrarily worse even if the positive cascades are generated non-cooperatively. result 1.00 0.94 0.75 asserted 1.00
s6 In addition, we give a discussion on how the cascade priority and activation order affect the rumor blocking problem. contribution 0.96 0.83 0.03 unclear 0.77
s7 We experimentally examine the Nash equilibrium of the proposed games by simulations done on real social network structures. method 0.86 0.96 0.05 asserted 0.98

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 0.90 · evidence from simulation or computation 0.65.

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Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

Misinformation and rumor can spread rapidly and widely through online social networks and therefore rumor controlling has become a critical issue. It is often assumed that there is a single authority whose goal is to minimize the spread of rumor by generating a positive cascade. In this paper, we study a more realistic scenario when there are multiple positive cascades generated by different agents. For the multiple-cascade diffusion, we propose the P2P independent cascade (PIC) model for private social communications. The main part of this paper is an analysis of the rumor blocking effect (i.e. the number of the users activated by rumor) when the agents non-cooperatively generate the positive cascades. We show that the rumor blocking effect provided by the Nash equilibrium will not be arbitrarily worse even if the positive cascades are generated non-cooperatively. In addition, we give a discussion on how the cascade priority and activation order affect the rumor blocking problem. We experimentally examine the Nash equilibrium of the proposed games by simulations done on real social network structures.

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