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Why lot: How sortition came to help representative democracy
Physics and Society · Submitted 12 Dec 2017
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim The paper shows that increasing the number of independent legislators up to a point enhances the efficiency of the parliament and puts into check the factionalism likely to arise from party discipline.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
In this paper we discuss the problems of modern representative democracy and we look at the selection of legislators by lot as a way to tame some of the drawbacks of that system. It is recalled at the beginning that resorting to sortition for the selection of public officers used to be a popular way of taming factionalism in public affairs. Factionalism is assumed to be detrimental to public affairs as public officers may favour their own faction (a tribe or a party) instead of pursuing the general interest. Moreover they tend to overinvest in strengthening their power, thus engaging in power struggles with opposing factions, unlikely to benefit society. In this respect we present a new mathematical model aiming at describing a more efficient parliament where sortition is brought to bear. It will be shown that starting from a parliament working with two parties (or coalitions), where the costs of representative democracy are quite apparent through the detrimental effects of party discipline, one can beneficially move towards a parliament where independent legislators, randomly selected from the population of constituents, sit alongside elected members who belong to a party and are subjected to party discipline. The paper shows that increasing the number of independent legislators up to a point enhances the efficiency of the parliament and puts into check the factionalism likely to arise from party discipline.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | In this paper we discuss the problems of modern representative democracy and we look at the selection of legislators by lot as a way to tame some of the drawbacks of that system. | contribution 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.08 | hedged possibility 0.45 |
| s1 | It is recalled at the beginning that resorting to sortition for the selection of public officers used to be a popular way of taming factionalism in public affairs. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.03 | asserted 0.99 |
| s2 | Factionalism is assumed to be detrimental to public affairs as public officers may favour their own faction (a tribe or a party) instead of pursuing the general interest. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.03 | asserted 0.83 |
| s3 | Moreover they tend to overinvest in strengthening their power, thus engaging in power struggles with opposing factions, unlikely to benefit society. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.02 | asserted 0.63 |
| s4 | In this respect we present a new mathematical model aiming at describing a more efficient parliament where sortition is brought to bear. | contribution 0.72 | 0.89 | 0.06 | asserted 0.80 |
| s5 | It will be shown that starting from a parliament working with two parties (or coalitions), where the costs of representative democracy are quite apparent through the detrimental effects of party discipline, one can beneficially move towards a parliament where independent legislators, randomly selected from the population of constituents, sit alongside elected members who belong to a party and are subjected to party discipline. | contribution 0.47 | 0.81 | 0.42 | asserted 0.68 |
| s6 | The paper shows that increasing the number of independent legislators up to a point enhances the efficiency of the parliament and puts into check the factionalism likely to arise from party discipline. | result 0.98 | 0.90 | 0.69 | asserted 1.00 |
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The paper
Original abstract
In this paper we discuss the problems of modern representative democracy and we look at the selection of legislators by lot as a way to tame some of the drawbacks of that system. It is recalled at the beginning that resorting to sortition for the selection of public officers used to be a popular way of taming factionalism in public affairs. Factionalism is assumed to be detrimental to public affairs as public officers may favour their own faction (a tribe or a party) instead of pursuing the general interest. Moreover they tend to overinvest in strengthening their power, thus engaging in power struggles with opposing factions, unlikely to benefit society. In this respect we present a new mathematical model aiming at describing a more efficient parliament where sortition is brought to bear. It will be shown that starting from a parliament working with two parties (or coalitions), where the costs of representative democracy are quite apparent through the detrimental effects of party discipline, one can beneficially move towards a parliament where independent legislators, randomly selected from the population of constituents, sit alongside elected members who belong to a party and are subjected to party discipline. The paper shows that increasing the number of independent legislators up to a point enhances the efficiency of the parliament and puts into check the factionalism likely to arise from party discipline.
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