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arxiv: 1712.05441 · v3 · pith:GGIOLAPTnew · submitted 2017-12-14 · 💻 cs.CR

A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords deceptiondefensiveprivacytypescybersecuritytaxonomygameinformation
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Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiquitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advocates and engineers have recently proposed using defensive deception as a means to leverage the information asymmetry typically enjoyed by attackers as a tool for defenders. The term deception, however, has been employed broadly and with a variety of meanings. In this paper, we survey 24 articles from 2008-2018 that use game theory to model defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy. Then we propose a taxonomy that defines six types of deception: perturbation, moving target defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement. These types are delineated by their information structures, agents, actions, and duration: precisely concepts captured by game theory. Our aims are to rigorously define types of defensive deception, to capture a snapshot of the state of the literature, to provide a menu of models which can be used for applied research, and to identify promising areas for future work. Our taxonomy provides a systematic foundation for understanding different types of defensive deception commonly encountered in cybersecurity and privacy.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Strategic Learning for Active, Adaptive, and Autonomous Cyber Defense

    cs.CR 2019-07 unverdicted novelty 5.0

    Introduces three strategic learning schemes for active cyber defenses under parameter, payoff, and environmental uncertainty that share a sensation-estimation-action feedback loop to converge on optimal policies.