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Promoting cooperation by punishing minority

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Han-Xin Yang, Xiaojie Chen

Physics and Society · Submitted 5 Feb 2018

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority.

how it is stated · asserted 1.00 read the record →

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arXiv ID1802.01257 (version 1)
Pith ID2R4RFSVS, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationHan-Xin Yang, Xiaojie Chen. "Promoting cooperation by punishing minority." arXiv:1802.01257 (2018). https://pith.science/paper/2R4RFSVS
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The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 5,396 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.07 · states limitation 0.11 · human participants 0.04 · controlled comparison 0.55 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.41 · compares with prior results 0.65 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. For no punishment or small values of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor. However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor, at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. The density of different types of groups is also studied.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. background 1.00 0.06 0.04 asserted 1.00
s1 In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. background 0.93 0.03 0.02 asserted 1.00
s2 In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. contribution 0.89 0.66 0.06 asserted 0.91
s3 Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. result 1.00 0.95 0.91 asserted 1.00
s4 For no punishment or small values of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor. result 1.00 0.86 0.06 asserted 1.00
s5 However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor, at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. result 1.00 0.91 0.11 asserted 1.00
s6 The density of different types of groups is also studied. contribution 0.68 0.88 0.02 asserted 0.52

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 0.54 · evidence from simulation or computation 0.90.

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  • C citations
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Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. For no punishment or small values of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor. However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor, at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. The density of different types of groups is also studied.

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