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Timing Channel in IaaS: How to Identify and Investigate

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arxiv 1804.01634 v1 pith:6544GZIC submitted 2018-04-05 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords channeltimingiaasidentificationbehaviorchannelsevidenceinvestigated
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Recently, the IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) Cloud (e.g., Amazon EC2) has been widely used by many organizations. However, some IaaS security issues create serious threats to its users. A typical issue is the timing channel. This kind of channel can be a cross-VM information channel, as proven by many researchers. Because it is covert and traceless, the traditional identification methods cannot build an accurate analysis model and obtain a compromised result. We investigated the underlying behavior of the timing channel from the perspective of the memory activity records and summarized the signature of the timing channel in the underlying memory activities. An identification method based on long-term behavior signatures was proposed. We proposed a complete set of forensics steps including evidence extraction, identification, record reserve, and evidence reports. We studied four typical timing channels, and the experiments showed that these channels can be detected and investigated, even with disturbances from normal processes.

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