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Robustifying Models Against Adversarial Attacks by Langevin Dynamics

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arxiv 1805.12017 v2 pith:CWXLYL4M submitted 2018-05-30 cs.LG stat.ML

classification cs.LGstat.ML
keywords adversarialalgorithmattacksdefensemaladeattackingclassdistribution
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Adversarial attacks on deep learning models have compromised their performance considerably. As remedies, a lot of defense methods were proposed, which however, have been circumvented by newer attacking strategies. In the midst of this ensuing arms race, the problem of robustness against adversarial attacks still remains unsolved. This paper proposes a novel, simple yet effective defense strategy where adversarial samples are relaxed onto the underlying manifold of the (unknown) target class distribution. Specifically, our algorithm drives off-manifold adversarial samples towards high density regions of the data generating distribution of the target class by the Metroplis-adjusted Langevin algorithm (MALA) with perceptual boundary taken into account. Although the motivation is similar to projection methods, e.g., Defense-GAN, our algorithm, called MALA for DEfense (MALADE), is equipped with significant dispersion - projection is distributed broadly, and therefore any whitebox attack cannot accurately align the input so that the MALADE moves it to a targeted untrained spot where the model predicts a wrong label. In our experiments, MALADE exhibited state-of-the-art performance against various elaborate attacking strategies.

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