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Inter-Operator Infrastructure Sharing: Trade-offs and Market
Networking and Internet Architecture · Submitted 28 Aug 2018
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim As such, when the required QoS is set above this bound, an MNO can improve its coverage by buying infrastructure from other MNOs.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
We model the problem of infrastructure sharing among mobile network operators (MNOs) as a multiple-seller single-buyer market where the MNOs are able to share their own base stations (BSs) with each other. First, we use techniques from stochastic geometry to find the coverage probability of the infrastructure sharing system and analyze the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS and the BS intensity of a buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of the coverage probability. We also analyze the power consumption of the network per unit area (i.e., areal power consumption) and show that it is a piecewise continuous function composed of a linear and a convex functions. We show that when the transmit power of the BSs and/or the BS intensity of a network increases, the system becomes interference limited and the coverage probability tends to saturate at a certain value. As such, when the required QoS is set above this bound, an MNO can improve its coverage by buying infrastructure from other MNOs. Subsequently, we analyze the strategy of a buyer MNO on choosing how many MNOs and which MNOs to buy the infrastructure from. The optimal strategy of the buyer is given by greedy fractional knapsack algorithm. On the sellers' side, the pricing and the fraction of infrastructure to be sold are formulated using a Cournot oligopoly game.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | We model the problem of infrastructure sharing among mobile network operators (MNOs) as a multiple-seller single-buyer market where the MNOs are able to share their own base stations (BSs) with each other. | method 0.41 | 0.74 | 0.04 | asserted 0.99 |
| s1 | First, we use techniques from stochastic geometry to find the coverage probability of the infrastructure sharing system and analyze the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS and the BS intensity of a buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of the coverage probability. | method 0.54 | 0.94 | 0.07 | asserted 1.00 |
| s2 | We also analyze the power consumption of the network per unit area (i.e., areal power consumption) and show that it is a piecewise continuous function composed of a linear and a convex functions. | result 0.90 | 0.94 | 0.06 | asserted 1.00 |
| s3 | We show that when the transmit power of the BSs and/or the BS intensity of a network increases, the system becomes interference limited and the coverage probability tends to saturate at a certain value. | result 0.99 | 0.89 | 0.12 | asserted 1.00 |
| s4 | As such, when the required QoS is set above this bound, an MNO can improve its coverage by buying infrastructure from other MNOs. | interpretation 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.21 | hedged possibility 0.54 |
| s5 | Subsequently, we analyze the strategy of a buyer MNO on choosing how many MNOs and which MNOs to buy the infrastructure from. | contribution 0.78 | 0.86 | 0.04 | asserted 0.66 |
| s6 | The optimal strategy of the buyer is given by greedy fractional knapsack algorithm. | result 0.49 | 0.87 | 0.14 | asserted 1.00 |
| s7 | On the sellers' side, the pricing and the fraction of infrastructure to be sold are formulated using a Cournot oligopoly game. | method 0.86 | 0.87 | 0.08 | asserted 0.98 |
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Original abstract
We model the problem of infrastructure sharing among mobile network operators (MNOs) as a multiple-seller single-buyer market where the MNOs are able to share their own base stations (BSs) with each other. First, we use techniques from stochastic geometry to find the coverage probability of the infrastructure sharing system and analyze the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS and the BS intensity of a buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of the coverage probability. We also analyze the power consumption of the network per unit area (i.e., areal power consumption) and show that it is a piecewise continuous function composed of a linear and a convex functions. We show that when the transmit power of the BSs and/or the BS intensity of a network increases, the system becomes interference limited and the coverage probability tends to saturate at a certain value. As such, when the required QoS is set above this bound, an MNO can improve its coverage by buying infrastructure from other MNOs. Subsequently, we analyze the strategy of a buyer MNO on choosing how many MNOs and which MNOs to buy the infrastructure from. The optimal strategy of the buyer is given by greedy fractional knapsack algorithm. On the sellers' side, the pricing and the fraction of infrastructure to be sold are formulated using a Cournot oligopoly game.
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