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Formally Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote Attestation

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arxiv 1811.00175 v4 pith:JTTTTPG3 submitted 2018-11-01 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords vrasedattestationfirstremotesecurityverificationco-designdevices
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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In this work, we take the first step towards formal verification of Remote Attestation (RA) by designing and verifying an architecture called VRASED: Verifiable Remote Attestation for Simple Embedded Devices. VRASED instantiates a hybrid (HW/SW) RA co-design aimed at low-end embedded systems, e.g., simple IoT devices. VRASED provides a level of security comparable to HW-based approaches, while relying on SW to minimize additional HW costs. Since security properties must be jointly guaranteed by HW and SW, verification is a challenging task, which has never been attempted before in the context of RA. We believe that VRASED is the first formally verified RA scheme. To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first formal verification of a HW/SW implementation of any security service. To demonstrate VRASED's practicality and low overhead, we instantiate and evaluate it on a commodity platform (TI MSP430). VRASED's publicly available implementation was deployed on the Basys3 FPGA.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. A Verified Architecture for Proofs of Execution on Remote Devices under Full Software Compromise

    cs.CR 2019-08 conditional novelty 8.0 of 10

    VAPE is a formally verified architecture that gives unforgeable proofs of execution on low-end microcontrollers under full software compromise, with low hardware overhead.

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