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RAIRE: Risk-Limiting Audits for IRV Elections

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arxiv 1903.08804 v2 pith:PXMJCRZW submitted 2019-03-20 cs.DS

RAIRE: Risk-Limiting Audits for IRV Elections

classification cs.DS
keywords electionsauditsballotsrisk-limitingresultauditballot-pollingcomparison
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect. Ballot-polling audits select ballots at random and interpret those ballots as evidence for and against the reported result, continuing this process until either they support the recorded result, or they fall back to a full manual recount. For elections with digitised scanning and counting of ballots, a comparison audit compares randomly selected digital ballots with their paper versions. Discrepancies are referred to as errors, and are used to build evidence against or in support of the recorded result. Risk-limiting audits for first-past-the-post elections are well understood, and used in some US elections. We define a number of approaches to ballot-polling and comparison risk-limiting audits for Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) elections. We show that for almost all real elections we found, we can perform a risk-limiting audit by looking at only a small fraction of the total ballots (assuming no errors were made in the tallying and distribution of votes).

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