Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 major objections 4 minor 1 cited by

Physical Layer Secret Key Generation in Static Environments

T0 review · 3 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-14 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗ Review JSON

Pith's one-line read The paper claims that injecting locally generated random symbols lets Alice and Bob derive high-rate secret keys from a static reciprocal channel, and it bounds Eve's success probability by $(2^{-2\delta}+\sqrt{2I(h_b;h_e)})^N+2^{-\delta…

desk verdict A clearly written protocol paper for static-environment key generation whose headline security bounds rest on an unproven and actually false privacy-amplification step; the system idea is worth knowing, but the main theorems do not go through as stated. read the letter →

arxiv 1908.03637 v2 pith:XUX2UMMC submitted 2019-08-09 cs.IT math.IT

Nasser Aldaghri , Hessam Mahdavifar This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.ITmath.IT
keywords physicallayersecuritysecretkeygenerationstaticchannelsinducedrandomnesssemanticuntrustedrelayOFDMprivacyamplification
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

Static wireless environments usually deny physical-layer key generation, because the channel coefficients do not change and there is no fresh common randomness. This paper claims that Alice and Bob can manufacture that randomness themselves: each side transmits its own randomly chosen QAM symbols, and multiplies what it sent by what it received, so the reciprocal channel coefficients become a shared noisy multiplier. Quantization, error-correction-based reconciliation, and universal hashing then turn those correlated samples into a secret key. The central security contribution is a computable upper bound on the probability that a passive eavesdropper recovers the key, roughly $2^{-31}$ for a direct link and $2^{-10.57}$ through an untrusted relay for the paper's example parameters. If the bounds hold, static IoT and sensor networks can refresh symmetric keys at useful rates without mobility, MIMO, or trusted relays.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing mechanism is induced randomness exchange. Each session, Alice and Bob transmit independent random QAM vectors $s_i$ and $v_i$ and multiply their own transmitted vector by the received vector, so the reciprocal channel coefficients act as a common random multiplier. In the relay version, the same multiplication is done with the two-hop channels $h_i$ and $g_i$, and the self-interference terms are cancelled using channel estimates, leaving $w_{i,ab}=s_i \circ v_i \circ g_i \circ \tilde h_i+\hat n_{i,3,a}$ at Alice and an analogous expression at Bob. The correlated samples are quantized with resolution $\delta$, reconciled with a code-offset secure sketch (an error-correcting-code construction that lets Bob recover Alice's exact sequence while leaking limited information), and privacy-amplified with a universal hash family that also produces a consistency check. The security theorems then convert information-theoretic leakage into a guessing probability: Theorem 3 uses a semantic-security relation that bounds how much Eve's observations raise her per-subcarrier success probability, and Theorem 4 uses Fano's inequality because the relay scenario's mutual information is too large for the semantic-security route.

What would settle it

Run the direct protocol with $N=16$, $\delta=2$, and $\rho=0.09$ (or any stated parameters), simulate Eve's maximum-likelihood estimate of Alice's quantized sequence from her own observations and the public reconciliation and hash messages, and compare her actual success rate in guessing the final key with the claimed bound $2^{-31}$; a success rate above the bound, or an estimated conditional min-entropy of the quantized sequence given Eve's information below $2\delta N$, would falsify the hash-uniformity step.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper's central claim is that high-rate secret key generation does not require temporal channel variation. In the protocol, Alice chooses a random vector $s_i$ and Bob chooses a random vector $v_i$ from an $M$-QAM constellation; after they exchange these vectors over an OFDM channel, Alice forms $w_{i,ab}=s_i \circ v_i \circ \tilde h_{i,ab}+s_i \circ n_{i,a}$ and Bob forms $\tilde w_{i,ab}=s_i \circ v_i \circ h_{i,ab}+v_i \circ n_{i,b}$. Reciprocity makes $h_{i,ab}\approx\tilde h_{i,ab}$, so these are highly correlated even though the channel is constant. The paper proves that if Eve is at least half a wavelength from Bob, her probability of a successful attack in the direct scenario is at most $(2^{-2\delta}+\sqrt{2I(h_b;h_e)})^N+2^{-\delta N}$, where $I(h_b;h_e)=-\log(1-\rho^2)$ and $\rho$ is the spatial correlation of Bob's and Eve's fading coefficients; with $N=16$, $\delta=2$, $\rho=0.09$, this is below $2^{-31}$. In the relay scenario, where no direct link exists and the relay is honest but curious, the same protocol structure yields the Fano-inequality bound $\left(1-\frac{H(q_a)-I_{ab,e}-1}{\log_2|Q_A|}\right)^N+2^{-\delta N}$, evaluated as roughly $2^{-10.57}$ under the paper's parameters.

Load-bearing premise

The proof's final step assumes that if Eve has not recovered all $N$ subcarriers of shared randomness, the universal-hash output is uniform enough from her point of view that her best key guess succeeds with probability at most $2^{-\delta N}$; this uniformity is asserted rather than derived from a proven min-entropy bound.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • In static indoor IoT or sensor networks, two devices can generate 64 correlated bits per session and a 32-bit final key after hashing, a rate that earlier static-channel protocols reach only with fractions to small numbers of bits per packet.
  • The direct-channel security bound decays like $\text{(per-subcarrier success)}^N+2^{-\delta N}$, so raising the number of OFDM subcarriers or the quantization resolution gives an exponential security margin under the paper's assumptions.
  • The relay scenario gives a quantitative guarantee for key agreement through an untrusted amplify-and-forward relay when no direct link exists, with the bound computable from SNR, constellation size, and mutual information estimates.
  • Both protocols remain applicable in dynamic environments as long as the channel is constant during each two-way exchange of induced randomness.
  • Universal-hash consistency checking keeps the probability of accepting a mismatched key below $1/p$, enabling automatic session retries without leaking key material.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • A direct test of the protocol's security would replace the asserted $2^{-\delta N}$ hash-uniformity step with a measured conditional min-entropy of the quantized sequence given Eve's transcript; if that entropy is below $2\delta N$, the numerical bounds would need to shrink.
  • Because the direct-channel bound is driven by the spatial correlation coefficient $\rho=[J_0(kd)]^2$, the scheme's security margin widens at higher carrier frequencies, where the half-wavelength decorrelation distance is smaller; this makes the method especially natural for millimetre-wave bands.
  • The induced-randomness construction suggests a route to multi-user secret sharing: each user contributes an independent random vector, and the reciprocal channel graph determines which pairs can multiply out correlated samples; the paper's relay analysis already treats an honest-but-curious helper, so chains of such helpers are a plausible extension.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper proposes a physical-layer secret key generation scheme for static environments based on induced randomness, in which Alice and Bob inject local random QAM symbols over OFDM subcarriers and use the reciprocal channel to obtain correlated samples. Two scenarios are considered: a direct channel and an untrusted amplify-and-forward relay. The protocol includes quantization, secure-sketch reconciliation, and universal-hash privacy amplification. The main claimed contributions are upper bounds on the probability of successful eavesdropping: Theorem 3 gives (2^{-2δ} + sqrt(2I(h_b;h_e)))^N + 2^{-δN} for the direct case, and Theorem 4 gives (1 - (H(q_a) - I_{ab,e} - 1)/log_2(|Q_A|))^N + 2^{-δN} for the relay case, with numerical values 2^{-31} and 2^{-10.57} respectively. The paper also includes extensive simulations, NIST randomness tests, and a NYUSIM-based evaluation.

Significance. If the security bounds were rigorously established, this would be a meaningful contribution to key generation in static environments, offering a low-complexity protocol and quantitative semantic-security guarantees where prior work mostly relied on decorrelation assumptions. The protocol design is interesting, and the simulation study is thorough, including realistic 5G mmWave channels. However, the central security proofs contain a load-bearing gap: the asserted bound on the probability of guessing the hashed key given partial information is neither proved nor true as stated, and the N-th power over subcarriers lacks a justification of independence. As a result, the headline numerical security claims are not supported by the current analysis.

major comments (3)
  1. [Section IV-A] The proof states that if Eve cannot recover all the shared randomness, 'the probability that she can guess the secret key correctly, by the property of hash functions in the privacy amplification part of our protocol, is at most 2^{-δN}'. This is not a consequence of Definition 2 or Eq. (23). Universal hashing only bounds the collision probability for two distinct inputs when the hash function is chosen uniformly; it does not imply that the hashed output is uniform or hard to guess conditioned on a partial observation of the input. A leftover-hash lemma would require a lower bound on the min-entropy of q_i given Eve's observations and public information, and no such bound appears in the paper. The claim is also false as stated for the construction in Eq. (24): if Eve knows all of q_{i,2} except one bit and q_{i,1}=1, then K = q_{i,1} q_{i,2} mod p takes two equally likely values, so Eve guesses it with probability 1/2, not ≤ 2^{-δN}. Since this 2^{-δN} term dominates the numerical value 2^{-31} (the first term alone is approximately 2^{-36.7}), Theorem 3 is not established.
  2. [Section IV-B] The same unsupported privacy-amplification step is used verbatim: 'If Eve cannot recover all the shared randomness bits in a single session, the probability that she correctly guesses the secret key, by the property of hash functions ... is at most 2^{-δN}'. No argument is provided that partial knowledge of q_a leaves enough min-entropy to make the hashed key uniform, and no leftover-hash lemma is invoked. Consequently, the relay-scenario bound in Eq. (39) also lacks justification.
  3. [Section IV] Both theorems raise a per-subcarrier success probability to the N-th power, with the text saying 'by using the independence of such events across the N subcarriers' (Eq. (45)). This independence is asserted, not proved. Even if the subcarrier channels and the induced symbols are mutually independent, the eavesdropper's success events are not automatically independent: Eve observes all subcarriers jointly and may combine her observations with a joint decoding strategy, so the probability of recovering the entire vector is not generally the product of the marginal per-subcarrier probabilities. This gap affects the form of both Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 independently of the hash-function issue.
minor comments (4)
  1. [Section IV-B] The numerical evaluation of the relay scenario relies on simulated estimates of I_{ab,e} and H(q_a). The text should explicitly state that these are empirical estimates rather than analytic upper bounds, so the value 2^{-10.57} is an illustration for the simulated parameters, not a guaranteed security guarantee.
  2. [Section V-B2] The comparison 'around 0.0015%' against '0.00153%' is clearer in decimal notation (e.g., 1.5×10^{-5} versus 1.53×10^{-5}).
  3. [Section V-B3] The NIST test results are empirical; the statement that the sequences 'pass all the tests' should be phrased as 'the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of randomness' to avoid overclaiming.
  4. [Section IV-A] In Eq. (31), the superscript k denoting the subcarrier is dropped in the notation I(h_b^k; h_e^k); the text should define the notation consistently.

Circularity Check

1 steps flagged · score 6.0 of 10

Security bound's 2^{-δN} term is asserted in the proof rather than derived, so the headline 2^{-31} is carried by an unproved privacy-amplification assumption.

  1. other [Proof of Theorem 3, Section IV-A (after Eq. (35)); identical step in Proof of Theorem 4, Section IV-B (after Eq. (45))]
    "If Eve cannot recover all the shared randomness, the probability that she can guess the secret key correctly, by the property of hash functions in the privacy amplification part of our protocol, is at most 2^{-δN}, when using a key sequence of half the quantized bit sequence length."

    This sentence supplies the second term of the theorem statement verbatim: the bound being proven is Pr(success) ≤ (...) + 2^{-δN}. The asserted bound is not a consequence of Definition 2 / Eq. (23), which only bounds collisions h(x)=h(y) for distinct full inputs x≠y under a uniform random hash index; it says nothing about guessing the hashed output when Eve has partial information about the input. No min-entropy lower bound on qi given Eve's observations and public values is proved, so a leftover-hash lemma cannot be invoked. Therefore the direct-scenario headline 2^{-31} is carried by this assumed term (the first term is ≈2^{-37}), and the same unproved assertion appears in Theorem 4's proof.

full rationale

The paper's main novelty, induced randomness, and the derived first terms of Theorems 3 and 4 are not circular: Lemma 2 uses standard Gaussian mutual information, Theorem 3's first term follows from [49, Thm. 5], and Theorem 4's first term follows from Fano's inequality and the data-processing inequality. The numerical values Iab,e and H(qa) in the relay scenario are simulated estimates of the quantities that enter the bound, not fitted parameters renamed as predictions. No load-bearing self-citation appears: the authors' own prior works are cited for background or the conference version, and the security theorems rest on external results. The circular gap is the repeated assertion that partial failure to recover the shared randomness leaves Eve with guessing probability at most 2^{-δN}. This bound is exactly the +2^{-δN} term in Eqs. (35) and (39), and it is asserted 'by the property of hash functions' without proof. Universal hashing alone cannot yield this conclusion, and no min-entropy or leftover-hash argument is provided. Thus the headline direct-scenario bound 2^{-31} is, in its dominant term, assumed rather than derived. The relay scenario's headline 2^{-10.57} is mostly from the Fano-based first term, but the theorem as stated still contains the unsupported second term. This is a partial circularity of the proof, not a complete equivalence of the whole derivation to its inputs.

Assumptions & free parameters 2 free parameters · 7 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The protocol relies on standard domain assumptions: reciprocity, passive eavesdropping, spatial decorrelation, and an authenticated public channel. The security proof additionally assumes subcarrier independence and a strong privacy-amplification uniformity condition without proof. Two numerical quantities (Iab,e and H(qa)) are estimated from simulations and used as inputs to the relay-scenario bound.

free parameters (2)
  • Iab_e_estimate = 1.39 bits
    Numerically estimated mutual information I(wab; we,1, we,2) used in Theorem 4's numerical bound; no derivation or error bars given.
  • H_qa_estimate = 3.86 bits
    Numerically estimated entropy of quantized sequence qa used in Theorem 4's numerical bound; no derivation or error bars given.
assumptions (7)
  • domain assumption Wireless channels are reciprocal (hab ≈ ~hab) during each exchange.
    Assumed throughout Section II; reciprocity is the basis for correlated samples.
  • domain assumption Eve is located at least λ/2 away from Alice and Bob (or Carol), giving ρ ≤ 0.09.
    Used in Section IV-A to bound I(hb;he) = -log(1-ρ^2).
  • domain assumption Eve is passive and only observes transmissions and public messages.
    Attacker model in Section II.
  • standard math [49, Theorem 5] converts mutual information into an increase in guessing probability of at most sqrt(2I).
    Used in Theorem 3 proof; not proven in this paper.
  • ad hoc to paper OFDM subcarriers behave independently for the eavesdropper's success events, allowing the N-th power in Theorems 3 and 4.
    The paper does not state or justify independence across subcarriers; this is implicit in the product bound.
  • ad hoc to paper If Eve has any partial information short of full recovery, her probability of guessing the hashed key is at most 2^-δN.
    Asserted in proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 without a min-entropy proof; this is the critical assumption.
  • standard math Fano's inequality and data processing inequality hold for the considered variables.
    Used in Theorem 4 proof.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Physical Layer Secret Key Generation in Static Environments." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/XUX2UMMC

@misc{pith2026190803637,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Physical Layer Secret Key Generation in Static Environments},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/XUX2UMMC}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:1908.03637}
}
abstract

Two legitimate parties, referred to as Alice and Bob, wish to generate secret keys from the wireless channel in the presence of an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve, in order to use such keys for encryption and decryption. In general, the secret key rate highly depends on the coherence time of the channel. In particular, a straightforward method of generating secret keys in static environments results in ultra-low rates. In order to resolve this problem, we introduce a low-complexity method called induced randomness. In this method, Alice and Bob independently generate local randomness to be used together with the uniqueness of the wireless channel coefficients in order to enable high-rate secret key generation. In this work, two scenarios are considered: first, when Alice and Bob share a direct communication channel, and second, when Alice and Bob do not have a direct link and communicate through an untrusted relay. After exchanging the induced randomness, post-processing is done by Alice and Bob to generate highly-correlated samples that are used for the key generation. Such samples are then converted into bits, disparities between the sequences generated by Alice and Bob are mitigated, and the resulting sequences are then hashed to compensate for the information leakage to the eavesdropper and to allow consistency checking of the generated key bit sequences. We utilize semantic security measures and information-theoretic inequalities to upper bound the probability of successful eavesdropping attack in terms of the mutual information measures that can be numerically computed. Given certain reasonable system parameters this bound is numerically evaluated to be $2^{-31}$ and $2^{-10.57}$ in the first and the second scenario, respectively.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 1908.03637 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. System model for direct secret key generation. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. System model for relay-based secret key generatio [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Direct secret key generation protocol overview of [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (6 more)
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Sorting wi,ab values before feeding them to the quantizer. yi,3,b, respectively, as follows: yi,3,a = α(si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,2,r) ◦ ehi + ni,3,a, (15) yi,3,b = α(si ◦ hi + vi ◦ gi + ni,2,r) ◦ egi + ni,3,b. (16) The value of the amplification factor α is assumed to be…
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Relay-based secret key generation protocol overv [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_4.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: The bit mismatch rate (BMR) between Alice’s sequen [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_6.png]
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: The bit error rate (BER) between Alice’s sequence a [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_7.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: The cumulative distribution function of the BER at [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_8.png]
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: The bit mismatch rate (BMR) in the direct SKG setup [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_10.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Entropy Bootstrapping for Wireless Embedded Systems

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A source-state-admitted multi-root boot entropy path for ESP32 IoT combines SRAM startup, public radio-burst local sampling, and asymmetric capsules, with measurements showing RF-disabled WDEV passes the same statisti...

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

52 extracted references · 50 canonical work pages · cited by 1 Pith paper

  1. [1]

    Fast secret key generati on in static en- vironments using induced randomness,

    N. Aldaghri and H. Mahdavifar, “Fast secret key generati on in static en- vironments using induced randomness,” in 2018 IEEE Global Communi- cations Conference (GLOBECOM). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–6

    work page 2018

  2. [2]

    197: Advanced encryption standard (AES),

    N. F. Pub, “197: Advanced encryption standard (AES),” Federal informa- tion processing standards publication, vol. 197, no. 441, p. 0311, 2001

    work page 2001

  3. [3]

    A method for obta ining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,

    R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obta ining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM , vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978

    work page 1978

  4. [4]

    Security for th e internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research iss ues,

    J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. S. Silva, “Security for th e internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research iss ues,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials , vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 2015

    work page 2015

  5. [5]

    Bloch and J

    M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-layer security: from information theory to security engineering. Cambridge University Press, 2011

    work page 2011

  6. [6]

    Common randomness in inform ation theory and cryptography. i. secret sharing,

    R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszár, “Common randomness in inform ation theory and cryptography. i. secret sharing,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, 1993

    work page 1993

  7. [7]

    Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information,

    U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information,” IEEE transactions on information theory, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, 1993

    work page 1993

  8. [8]

    R adio- telepathy: extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless chan- nel,

    S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Y e, and A. Reznik, “R adio- telepathy: extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless chan- nel,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking. ACM, 2008, pp. 128–139

    work page 2008

Show all 52 references
  1. [9]

    Key gene ration from wireless channels: A review,

    J. Zhang, T. Q. Duong, A. Marshall, and R. Woods, “Key gene ration from wireless channels: A review,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 614–626, 2016

    2016

  2. [10]

    Channel identifica tion: Secret sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,

    R. Wilson, D. Tse, and R. A. Scholtz, “Channel identifica tion: Secret sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information F orensics and Security, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 364–375, 2007

    2007

  3. [11]

    Secret key generation exploi ting channel characteristics in wireless communications,

    K. Ren, H. Su, and Q. Wang, “Secret key generation exploi ting channel characteristics in wireless communications,” IEEE Wireless Communica- tions, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011

    2011

  4. [12]

    A. F. Molisch, Wireless communications. John Wiley & Sons, 2012, vol. 34

    2012

  5. [13]

    Secret key extraction from wire- less signal strength in real environments,

    S. N. Premnath, S. Jana, J. Croft, P . L. Gowda, M. Clark, S . K. Kasera, N. Patwari, and S. V . Krishnamurthy, “Secret key extraction from wire- less signal strength in real environments,” IEEE Transactions on mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 917–930, 2013

    2013

  6. [14]

    Fast and practical secret key ex- traction by exploiting channel response,

    H. Liu, Y . Wang, J. Y ang, and Y . Chen, “Fast and practical secret key ex- traction by exploiting channel response,” in INFOCOM, 2013 Proceed- ings IEEE. IEEE, 2013, pp. 3048–3056

    2013

  7. [15]

    KEEP: Fast secret key extraction protocol for D2D communication,

    W. Xi, X.-Y . Li, C. Qian, J. Han, S. Tang, J. Zhao, and K. Zh ao, “KEEP: Fast secret key extraction protocol for D2D communication, ” in Qual- ity of Service (IWQoS), 2014 IEEE 22nd International Sympos ium of . IEEE, 2014, pp. 350–359

    2014

  8. [16]

    Exploiting chann el diversity in secret key generation from multipath fading randomness,

    Y . Liu, S. C. Draper, and A. M. Sayeed, “Exploiting chann el diversity in secret key generation from multipath fading randomness,” IEEE Transac- tions on information forensics and security , vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1484–1497, 2012

    2012

  9. [17]

    Secure key genera- tion from OFDM subcarriers’ channel responses,

    J. Zhang, A. Marshall, R. Woods, and T. Q. Duong, “Secure key genera- tion from OFDM subcarriers’ channel responses,” in 2014 IEEE Globe- com W orkshops (GC Wkshps). IEEE, 2014, pp. 1302–1307

    2014

  10. [18]

    Physical layer key generation in wireless net works: challenges and opportunities,

    K. Zeng, “Physical layer key generation in wireless net works: challenges and opportunities,” IEEE Communications Magazine , vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 33–39, 2015

    2015

  11. [19]

    On the ergodic secret-key agreement over spatially correl ated multiple- antenna channels with public discussion,

    M. Zorgui, Z. Rezki, B. Alomair, E. A. Jorswieck, and M.- S. Alouini, “On the ergodic secret-key agreement over spatially correl ated multiple- antenna channels with public discussion,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 495–510, 2016

    2016

  12. [20]

    Secret key g eneration from reciprocal spatially correlated MIMO channels,

    E. A. Jorswieck, A. Wolf, and S. Engelmann, “Secret key g eneration from reciprocal spatially correlated MIMO channels,” in Globecom W orkshops (GC Wkshps), 2013 IEEE . IEEE, 2013, pp. 1245–1250. 14

    2013

  13. [21]

    Secret Beam: Robust secre t key agree- ment for mmWave massive MIMO 5G communication,

    L. Jiao, N. Wang, and K. Zeng, “Secret Beam: Robust secre t key agree- ment for mmWave massive MIMO 5G communication,” in 2018 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) . IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–6

    2018

  14. [22]

    Applyin g beamform- ing to address temporal correlation in wireless channel cha racterization- based secret key generation,

    M. G. Madiseh, S. W. Neville, and M. L. McGuire, “Applyin g beamform- ing to address temporal correlation in wireless channel cha racterization- based secret key generation,” IEEE Transactions on Information F oren- sics and Security, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1278–1287, 2012

    2012

  15. [23]

    Physical layer wireless se curity made fast and channel independent,

    S. Gollakota and D. Katabi, “Physical layer wireless se curity made fast and channel independent,” in INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE . IEEE, 2011, pp. 1125–1133

    2011

  16. [24]

    Guaranteeing secrecy using artific ial noise,

    S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artific ial noise,” IEEE transactions on wireless communications, vol. 7, no. 6, 2008

    2008

  17. [25]

    Fast and scalable secr et key gen- eration exploiting channel phase randomness in wireless ne tworks,

    Q. Wang, H. Su, K. Ren, and K. Kim, “Fast and scalable secr et key gen- eration exploiting channel phase randomness in wireless ne tworks,” in 2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM . IEEE, 2011, pp. 1422–1430

    2011

  18. [26]

    Fast secret key generation in stat ic wireless net- works: A virtual channel approach,

    P . Huang and X. Wang, “Fast secret key generation in stat ic wireless net- works: A virtual channel approach,” in 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFO- COM. IEEE, 2013, pp. 2292–2300

    2013

  19. [27]

    Security analysis of a novel ar- tificial randomness approach for fast key generation,

    G. Li, A. Hu, J. Zhang, and B. Xiao, “Security analysis of a novel ar- tificial randomness approach for fast key generation,” in GLOBECOM 2017-2017 IEEE Global Communications Conference. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6

    2017

  20. [28]

    Manipulatable wirele ss key estab- lishment,

    S. Fang, I. Markwood, and Y . Liu, “Manipulatable wirele ss key estab- lishment,” in 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–9

    2017

  21. [29]

    A provably sec ure true ran- dom number generator with built-in tolerance to active atta cks,

    B. Sunar, W. J. Martin, and D. R. Stinson, “A provably sec ure true ran- dom number generator with built-in tolerance to active atta cks,” IEEE Transactions on computers, vol. 56, no. 1, 2007

    2007

  22. [30]

    A novel app roach to secure communication in physical layer via coupled dynamical syst ems,

    N. Ebrahimi, H. Mahdavifar, and E. Afshari, “A novel app roach to secure communication in physical layer via coupled dynamical syst ems,” Pro- ceedings of IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBEC OM), 2018

    2018

  23. [31]

    Secret key generation v ia pulse- coupled synchronization,

    H. Mahdavifar and N. Ebrahimi, “Secret key generation v ia pulse- coupled synchronization,” Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) , pp. 3037–3041, 2019

    2019

  24. [32]

    A novel physical layer security technique us ing master- slave full duplex communication,

    N. Ebrahimi, B. Y ektakhah, K. Sarabandi, H.-S. Kim, D. D . Wentzloff, and D. Blaauw, “A novel physical layer security technique us ing master- slave full duplex communication,” Proceedings of IEEE/MTT-S Interna- tional Microwave Symposium (IMS), pp. 1096–1099, 2019

    2019

  25. [33]

    Cooperative key generation in wireless networks,

    L. Lai, Y . Liang, and W. Du, “Cooperative key generation in wireless networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications , vol. 30, no. 8, pp. 1578–1588, 2012

    2012

  26. [34]

    Cooperative secret key gener ation from phase estimation in narrowband fading channels,

    Q. Wang, K. Xu, and K. Ren, “Cooperative secret key gener ation from phase estimation in narrowband fading channels,” IEEE Journal on se- lected areas in communications, vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 1666–1674, 2012

    2012

  27. [35]

    Improvi ng wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays,

    L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P . Petropulu, and H. V . Poor, “Improvi ng wireless physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE transactions on sig- nal processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, 2010

    2010

  28. [36]

    Physical-layer se cret key agree- ment in two-way wireless relaying systems,

    T. Shimizu, H. Iwai, and H. Sasaoka, “Physical-layer se cret key agree- ment in two-way wireless relaying systems,” IEEE Transactions on In- formation F orensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 650–660, 2011

    2011

  29. [37]

    Secret key generation in the two-way relay channel with active attackers

    H. Zhou, L. M. Huie, and L. Lai, “Secret key generation in the two-way relay channel with active attackers.” IEEE Trans. Information F orensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 476–488, 2014

    2014

  30. [38]

    Physical layer se curity for two- way untrusted relaying with friendly jammers,

    R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han, and B. Jiao, “Physical layer se curity for two- way untrusted relaying with friendly jammers,” IEEE Transactions on V ehicular Technology, vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3693–3704, 2012

    2012

  31. [39]

    Sec ret key gener- ation from static channels with untrusted relays,

    R. Guillaume, S. Ludwig, A. Müller, and A. Czylwik, “Sec ret key gener- ation from static channels with untrusted relays,” in Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob), 2015 IE EE 11th International Conference on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 635–642

    2015

  32. [40]

    Physical-layer sec ret key gen- eration with colluding untrusted relays,

    C. D. T. Thai, J. Lee, and T. Q. Quek, “Physical-layer sec ret key gen- eration with colluding untrusted relays,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 1517–1530, 2016

    2016

  33. [41]

    A fuzzy commitment scheme,

    A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, “A fuzzy commitment scheme, ” in Proceed- ings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communication s secu- rity. ACM, 1999, pp. 28–36

    1999

  34. [42]

    T. H. Cormen, Introduction to algorithms. MIT press, 2009

    2009

  35. [43]

    A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom number generators fo r crypto- graphic applications,

    A. Rukhin, J. Soto, J. Nechvatal, M. Smid, and E. Barker, “A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom number generators fo r crypto- graphic applications,” Booz-Allen and Hamilton Inc Mclean V a, Tech. Rep., 2001

    2001

  36. [44]

    A novel mi llimeter-wave channel simulator and applications for 5G wireless communi cations,

    S. Sun, G. R. MacCartney, and T. S. Rappaport, “A novel mi llimeter-wave channel simulator and applications for 5G wireless communi cations,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC ). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–7

    2017

  37. [45]

    End-to-end performance of transmis- sion systems with relays over rayleigh-fading channels,

    M. O. Hasna and M.-S. Alouini, “End-to-end performance of transmis- sion systems with relays over rayleigh-fading channels,” IEEE transac- tions on Wireless Communications, vol. 2, no. 6, pp. 1126–1131, 2003

    2003

  38. [46]

    Error bounds for convolutional codes and a n asymptotically optimum decoding algorithm,

    A. Viterbi, “Error bounds for convolutional codes and a n asymptotically optimum decoding algorithm,” IEEE Transactions on Information The- ory, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 260–269, 1967

    1967

  39. [47]

    Fuzzy extractors: Ho w to gener- ate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,

    Y . Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: Ho w to gener- ate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,” in International conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques. Springer, 2004, pp. 523–540

    2004

  40. [48]

    Probabilistic encryptio n,

    S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, “Probabilistic encryptio n,” Journal of com- puter and system sciences , vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 270–299, 1984

    1984

  41. [49]

    Semantic securit y for the wiretap channel,

    M. Bellare, S. Tessaro, and A. V ardy, “Semantic securit y for the wiretap channel,” in Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2012 . Springer, 2012, pp. 294–311

    2012

  42. [50]

    T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory . John Wiley & Sons, 2012

    2012

  43. [51]

    Secret key generation us ing physical channels with imperfect CSI,

    S. Primak, K. Liu, and X. Wang, “Secret key generation us ing physical channels with imperfect CSI,” in 2014 IEEE 80th V ehicular Technology Conference (VTC2014-Fall). IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–5

    2014

  44. [52]

    Distributed multi-us er secret shar- ing,

    M. Soleymani and H. Mahdavifar, “Distributed multi-us er secret shar- ing,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1141–1145

    2018

Pith tools

Reviewed August 14, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.