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Hidden Trigger Backdoor Attacks

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arxiv 1910.00033 v2 pith:RHKR272G submitted 2019-09-30 cs.CV

classification cs.CV
keywords triggerattacksdatabackdoorattackpoisoneddeepmodel
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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With the success of deep learning algorithms in various domains, studying adversarial attacks to secure deep models in real world applications has become an important research topic. Backdoor attacks are a form of adversarial attacks on deep networks where the attacker provides poisoned data to the victim to train the model with, and then activates the attack by showing a specific small trigger pattern at the test time. Most state-of-the-art backdoor attacks either provide mislabeled poisoning data that is possible to identify by visual inspection, reveal the trigger in the poisoned data, or use noise to hide the trigger. We propose a novel form of backdoor attack where poisoned data look natural with correct labels and also more importantly, the attacker hides the trigger in the poisoned data and keeps the trigger secret until the test time. We perform an extensive study on various image classification settings and show that our attack can fool the model by pasting the trigger at random locations on unseen images although the model performs well on clean data. We also show that our proposed attack cannot be easily defended using a state-of-the-art defense algorithm for backdoor attacks.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. From Detection to Correction: Backdoor-Resilient Face Recognition via Vision-Language Trigger Detection and Noise-Based Neutralization

    cs.CV 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    A majority vote of large vision-language models is claimed to detect backdoor triggers in face images, with calibrated noise correcting poisoned samples at 100% accuracy.

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