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Inverse Dynamic Games Based on Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning

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arxiv 1911.07503 v2 pith:KH4Q2F7T submitted 2019-11-18 eess.SY cs.GTcs.MAcs.SY

classification eess.SYcs.GTcs.MAcs.SY
keywords inversedynamiccostfunctiongamesparametersentropyequilibrium
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We consider the inverse problem of dynamic games, where cost function parameters are sought which explain observed behavior of interacting players. Maximum entropy inverse reinforcement learning is extended to the N-player case in order to solve inverse dynamic games with continuous-valued state and control spaces. We present methods for identification of cost function parameters from observed data which correspond to (i) a Pareto efficient solution, (ii) an open-loop Nash equilibrium or (iii) a feedback Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we give results on the unbiasedness of the estimation of cost function parameters for each arising class of inverse dynamic game. The applicability of the methods is demonstrated with simulation examples of a nonlinear and a linear-quadratic dynamic game.

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