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Scratch that! An Evolution-based Adversarial Attack against Neural Networks

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arxiv 1912.02316 v3 pith:PZ7K3EDO submitted 2019-12-05 cs.NE cs.LGeess.IV

classification cs.NEcs.LGeess.IV
keywords imagescratchesadversarialattackadversariesattackscifar-10pixels
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

We study black-box adversarial attacks for image classifiers in a constrained threat model, where adversaries can only modify a small fraction of pixels in the form of scratches on an image. We show that it is possible for adversaries to generate localized \textit{adversarial scratches} that cover less than $5\%$ of the pixels in an image and achieve targeted success rates of $98.77\%$ and $97.20\%$ on ImageNet and CIFAR-10 trained ResNet-50 models, respectively. We demonstrate that our scratches are effective under diverse shapes, such as straight lines or parabolic B\a'ezier curves, with single or multiple colors. In an extreme condition, in which our scratches are a single color, we obtain a targeted attack success rate of $66\%$ on CIFAR-10 with an order of magnitude fewer queries than comparable attacks. We successfully launch our attack against Microsoft's Cognitive Services Image Captioning API and propose various mitigation strategies.

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  1. Amnesia as a Catalyst for Enhancing Black Box Pixel Attacks in Image Classification and Object Detection

    cs.CV 2025-02 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A reinforcement-learning attack using a memory-and-reset 'Forget' process fools classifiers and object detectors by modifying fewer than 0.1% of pixels, with fewer queries than prior query-based attacks.

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