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Semicooperation under curved strategy spacetime

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arxiv 1912.12146 v1 pith:5ZC6CXRA submitted 2019-12-27 math.OC econ.TH

classification math.OCecon.TH
keywords firmsstrategycooperationspacetimeundercooperativecurvedeconomic
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Mutually beneficial cooperation is a common part of economic systems as firms in partial cooperation with others can often make a higher sustainable profit. Though cooperative games were popular in 1950s, recent interest in non-cooperative games is prevalent despite the fact that cooperative bargaining seems to be more useful in economic and political applications. In this paper we assume that the strategy space and time are inseparable with respect to a contract. Under this assumption we show that the strategy spacetime is a dynamic curved Liouville-like 2-brane quantum gravity surface under asymmetric information and that traditional Euclidean geometry fails to give a proper feedback Nash equilibrium. Cooperation occurs when two firms' strategies fall into each other's influence curvature in this strategy spacetime. Small firms in an economy dominated by large firms are subject to the influence of large firms. We determine an optimal feedback semi-cooperation of the small firm in this case using a Liouville-Feynman path integral method.

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