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OAuth 2.0 authorization using blockchain-based tokens

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arxiv 2001.10461 v1 pith:H2F4H5IE submitted 2020-01-28 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords oauthtokenaccessprotocolsecuretokensauthorizationcontracts
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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OAuth 2.0 is the industry-standard protocol for authorization. It facilitates secure service provisioning, as well as secure interoperability among diverse stakeholders. All OAuth 2.0 protocol flows result in the creation of an access token, which is then used by a user to request access to a protected resource. Nevertheless, the definition of access tokens is transparent to the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which does not specify any particular token format, how tokens are generated, or how they are used. Instead, the OAuth 2.0 specification leaves all these as design choices for integrators. In this paper, we propose a new type of OAuth 2.0 token backed by a distributed ledger. Our construction is secure, and it supports proof-of-possession, auditing, and accountability. Furthermore, we provide added-value token management services, including revocation, delegation, and fair exchange by leveraging smart contracts. We realized a proof-of-concept implementation of our solution using Ethereum smart contracts and the ERC-721 token specification.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Give Them an Inch and They Will Take a Mile:Understanding and Measuring Caller Identity Confusion in MCP-Based AI Systems

    cs.CR 2026-03 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Most sampled MCP servers do not bind authorization to the identity of the calling agent, so a single authorization can be silently reused by other callers.

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