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Concentration inequality using unconfirmed knowledge
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We give a concentration inequality based on the premise that random variables take values within a particular region. The concentration inequality guarantees that, for any sequence of correlated random variables, the difference between the sum of conditional expectations and that of the observed values takes a small value with high probability when the expected values are evaluated under the condition that the past values are known. Our inequality outperforms other well-known inequalities, e.g. the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, especially in terms of the convergence speed when the random variables are highly biased. This high performance of our inequality is provided by the key idea in which we predict some parameters and adopt the predicted values in the inequality.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
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