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A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity

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arxiv 2003.01536 v1 pith:TPW6F2LR submitted 2020-02-29 econ.TH math.OC

Dimitri J. Papageorgiou , Francisco Trespalacios , Stuart Harwood This is my paper · ORCID
classification econ.THmath.OC
keywords discretely-constrainednash-cournotgamesclaimcomplementaritysolvingapplicationarise
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Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.

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