Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Hold the Door! Fingerprinting Your Car Key to Prevent Keyless Entry Car Theft

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2003.13251 v1 pith:3FCH5NAN submitted 2020-03-30 cs.CR eess.SP

classification cs.CReess.SP
keywords entrykeylesssystemsattackshodordoorunlockauthentication
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Recently, the traditional way to unlock car doors has been replaced with a keyless entry system which proves more convenient for automobile owners. When a driver with a key fob is in the vicinity of the vehicle, doors automatically unlock on user command. However, unfortunately, it has been shown that these keyless entry systems are vulnerable to signal relaying attacks. While it is evident that automobile manufacturers incorporate preventative methods to secure these keyless entry systems, they continue to be vulnerable to a range of attacks. Relayed signals result in valid packets that are verified as legitimate, and this makes it is difficult to distinguish a legitimate door unlock request from a malicious signal. In response to this vulnerability, this paper presents an RF fingerprinting method (coined HOld the DOoR, HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systems the first attempt to exploit the RF fingerprint technique in the automotive domain. HODOR is designed as a sub authentication method that supports existing authentication systems for keyless entry systems and does not require any modification of the main system to perform. Through a series of experiments, the results demonstrate that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks on keyless entry systems. HODOR achieves both an average false positive rate (FPR) of 0.27 percent with a false negative rate (FNR) of 0 percent for the detection of simulated attacks, corresponding to current research on keyless entry car theft.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Vehicular Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network: A Comprehensive Survey and Evaluation

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A survey of 53 CAN intrusion detection systems with a re-implemented benchmark of 19 methods on one real-vehicle dataset, showing that most target classic attacks and struggle with masquerade and diagnostic threats.

Pith tools