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Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action

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arxiv 2004.13264 v5 pith:JGGXREKZ submitted 2020-04-28 econ.TH

Orhan Aygün , Bertan Turhan This is my paper · ORCID
classification econ.TH
keywords reservationsverticalde-reservationshorizontalindiaotheractionaffirmative
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Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. There is no well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations jointly with vertical reservation and OBC de-reservations. Sequential processes currently in use for OBC de-reservations and meritorious reserve candidates lead to severe shortcomings. Most importantly, indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. To overcome these and other related issues, we design several different choice rules for institutions that take meritocracy, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations into account. We propose a centralized mechanism to satisfactorily clear matching markets in India.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Strategyproof Maximum Matching under Dichotomous Agent Preferences

    cs.GT 2025-02 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Two equivalent mechanism families, SAFE and Rank-Maximal, achieve maximum-size, fair, strategyproof, Pareto-efficient, and non-bossy matching under dichotomous agent preferences.

  2. Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals

    cs.GT 2024-12 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A school can enforce multiple diversity quotas while maximizing the minimum admission share of every type-combination group, and the paper gives a claimed-unique choice function and flow algorithms for it.

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