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The Fairness of Leximin in Allocation of Indivisible Chores
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The leximin solution -- which selects an allocation that maximizes the minimum utility, then the second minimum utility, and so forth -- is known to provide EFX (envy-free up to any good) fairness guarantee in some contexts when allocating indivisible goods. However, it remains unknown how fair the leximin solution is when used to allocate indivisible chores. In this paper, we demonstrate that the leximin solution can be modified to also provide compelling fairness guarantees for the allocation of indivisible chores. First, we generalize the definition of the leximin solution. Then, we show that the leximin solution finds a PROP1 (proportional up to one good) and PO (Pareto-optimal) allocation for 3 or 4 agents in the context of chores allocation with additive distinct valuations. Additionally, we prove that the leximin solution is EFX for combinations of goods and chores for agents with general but identical valuations.
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Cited by 2 Pith papers
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EFX for Additive Chores: Nonexistence, Pareto Incompatibility, and Bi-Valued Existence
No EFX allocation exists for tri-valued additive chore instances with n≥4 agents; EFX is incompatible with Pareto optimality for bi-valued positive-cost instances with n≥4; EFX exists for n=4.
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Weighted Envy Freeness With Bounded Subsidies
The paper defines weighted-envy-freeable allocations, proves a no-positive-cycle characterization, and gives polynomial-time subsidy bounds for general, identical, and binary additive valuations; the general-additive ...
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