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Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
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Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversifying search results). All these applications share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives -- and the study of multi-winner voting is the principled analysis of this task. This book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. One speaks of approval preferences if voters express their preferences by providing a set of candidates they approve. Approval preferences thus separate candidates in approved and disapproved ones, a simple, binary classification. The corresponding multi-winner voting rules are called approval-based committee (ABC) rules. Due to the simplicity of approval preferences, ABC rules are widely suitable for practical use. Recent years have seen a rising interest in ABC voting. While multi-winner voting has been originally a topic studied by economists and political scientists, a significant share of recent progress has occurred in the field of computational social choice. This discipline is situated in the intersection of artificial intelligence, computer science, economics, and (to a lesser degree) political science, combining insights and methods from these distinct fields. The goal of this book is to present fundamental concepts and results for ABC voting and to discuss the recent advances in computational social choice. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant applications.
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