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Mean field games with absorption and common noise with a model of bank run
Probability · Submitted 1 Jul 2021
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities.
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The abstract, sentence by sentence
We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. | contribution 0.55 | 0.62 | 0.07 | asserted 0.96 |
| s1 | We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. | result 0.82 | 0.96 | 0.61 | asserted 1.00 |
| s2 | We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. | method 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.09 | asserted 1.00 |
| s3 | We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. | contribution 0.67 | 0.95 | 0.11 | asserted 1.00 |
| s4 | Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. | method 0.54 | 0.32 | 0.04 | asserted 0.85 |
| s5 | We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework. | contribution 0.99 | 0.92 | 0.09 | asserted 0.85 |
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Original abstract
We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework.
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References
How the literature uses it
7 arXiv papers cite this in 10 sentences
Papers citing it · 5 sentences without a confident label
Compares with it 1 paper
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Second, in contrast to [ref] , where the coefficients of the players' processes may depend on the loss process and to [ref] , which further includes a driver which is a smoothed version of $L$ (hence modeling delayed effects of hitting the boundary), we consider the firm values driven by $L$ directly, resulting in an instantaneous effect of defaults and the emergence of systemic events.
Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem · Contributions and findings · 1.00
Cites it as background 3 papers
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The theory on mean-field games with regular control and absorption has received a lot of interest recently, being developed in [ref] , and using the linear programming approach in [ref] .
Linear Programming Fictitious Play algorithm for Mean Field Games with optimal stopping and absorption · Introduction · 0.89
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A model for bank runs with common noise and smooth transmission of boundary losses was analysed in [ref] .
Contagious McKean--Vlasov problems with common noise: from smooth to singular feedback through hitting times · Introduction · 0.92
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Specific stochastic MFGs with absorption have been considered by, e.g. Campi and coauthors in [ref] .
Mean-Field Liquidation Games with Market Drop-out · Introduction · 0.91
What it cites
Cites as background 1 paper
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For a recent survey of the many applications of such a class of games, especially in economics and finance, we refer to [ref] .
Applications of Mean Field Games in Financial Engineering and Economic Theory · Introduction · 0.99
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