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Mean field games with absorption and common noise with a model of bank run

Probability · Submitted 1 Jul 2021

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities.

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arXiv ID2107.00603 (version 2)
Pith IDNGE44ZO4, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationLuciano Campi, Matteo Burzoni. "Mean field games with absorption and common noise with a model of bank run." arXiv:2107.00603 (2021). https://pith.science/paper/NGE44ZO4
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What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.09 · states limitation 0.46 · human participants 0.03 · controlled comparison 0.02 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.05 · compares with prior results 0.07 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

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arXiv listing abstract v2. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework.

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What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. contribution 0.55 0.62 0.07 asserted 0.96
s1 We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. result 0.82 0.96 0.61 asserted 1.00
s2 We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. method 1.00 0.96 0.09 asserted 1.00
s3 We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. contribution 0.67 0.95 0.11 asserted 1.00
s4 Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. method 0.54 0.32 0.04 asserted 0.85
s5 We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework. contribution 0.99 0.92 0.09 asserted 0.85

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 1.00 · evidence from proof or derivation 1.00.

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Original abstract

We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state space. We provide a general result for the existence of weak mean field equilibria which, due to the absorption and the common noise, are given by random flow of sub-probabilities. We first use a fixed point argument to find solutions to the mean field problem in a reduced setting resulting from a discretization procedure and then we prove convergence of such equilibria to the desired solution. We exploit these ideas also to construct $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for the $N$-player game. Since the approximation is two-fold, one given by the mean field limit and one given by the discretization, some suitable convergence results are needed. We also introduce and discuss a novel model of bank run that can be studied within this framework.

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7 arXiv papers cite this in 10 sentences

Each citing sentence is taken from the citing paper's LaTeX source and typed by Pith's classifier. A label appears at probability 0.8 or more (0.95 for support), a contest at 0.7 or more; the quoted words are the citing authors'. How each label was checked · JSON

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  • Second, in contrast to [ref] , where the coefficients of the players' processes may depend on the loss process and to [ref] , which further includes a driver which is a smoothed version of $L$ (hence modeling delayed effects of hitting the boundary), we consider the firm values driven by $L$ directly, resulting in an instantaneous effect of defaults and the emergence of systemic events.

    Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem · Contributions and findings · 1.00

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