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$O\left(1/T\right)$ Time-Average Convergence in a Generalization of Multiagent Zero-Sum Games

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arxiv 2110.02482 v1 pith:7J6HQEYJ submitted 2021-10-06 cs.GT cs.MA

classification cs.GTcs.MA
keywords descentgradientgamesalternatingconvergenceequilibriageneralizationlarger
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abstract

We introduce a generalization of zero-sum network multiagent matrix games and prove that alternating gradient descent converges to the set of Nash equilibria at rate $O(1/T)$ for this set of games. Alternating gradient descent obtains this convergence guarantee while using fixed learning rates that are four times larger than the optimistic variant of gradient descent. Experimentally, we show with 97.5% confidence that, on average, these larger learning rates result in time-averaged strategies that are 2.585 times closer to the set of Nash equilibria than optimistic gradient descent.

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  1. Characterizing Nash Equilibria in Zero-Sum Games: A Physics-Inspired, Parallelizable Approach with a Linear Number of Gradient Queries

    cs.GT 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Alternating gradient descent energy invariants can be turned into linear equations that recover the Nash equilibrium in O(k) iterations, provided the equation system is non-degenerate.

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