Pith. Sign in

RECORD

Robust Voting Rules from Algorithmic Robust Statistics

Data Structures and Algorithms · Submitted 13 Dec 2021

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim Our main result is an efficiently computable estimator that achieves nearly optimal robustness guarantees.

how it is stated · asserted 1.00 read the record →

Comment (0) Read on arXiv ↗
Cite ▾
arXiv ID2112.06380 (version 2)
Pith ID5GDMET6M, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationAllen Liu, Ankur Moitra. "Robust Voting Rules from Algorithmic Robust Statistics." arXiv:2112.06380 (2021). https://pith.science/paper/5GDMET6M
Claim paper

The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

Open the compiled record

Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 6,262 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.07 · states limitation 0.49 · human participants 0.08 · controlled comparison 0.14 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.23 · compares with prior results 0.92 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v2. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. This means that a single voter or a group of colluding voters can vote strategically and drastically affect the outcome. Motivated by recent progress in algorithmic robust statistics, we revisit the fundamental problem of estimating the central ranking in a Mallows model, but ask for an estimator that is provably robust, unlike the MLE. Our main result is an efficiently computable estimator that achieves nearly optimal robustness guarantees. In particular the robustness guarantees are dimension-independent in the sense that our overall accuracy does not depend on the number of alternatives being ranked. As an immediate consequence, we show that while the landmark Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem tells us a strong impossiblity result about designing strategy-proof voting rules, there are quantitatively strong ways to protect against large coalitions if we assume that the remaining voters voters are honest and their preferences are sampled from a Mallows model. Our work also makes technical contributions to algorithmic robust statistics by designing new spectral filtering techniques that can exploit the intricate combinatorial dependencies in the Mallows model.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. background 1.00 0.07 0.02 asserted 0.99
s1 However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. background 0.81 0.10 0.02 asserted 0.72
s2 This means that a single voter or a group of colluding voters can vote strategically and drastically affect the outcome. background 0.68 0.09 0.02 asserted 0.94
s3 Motivated by recent progress in algorithmic robust statistics, we revisit the fundamental problem of estimating the central ranking in a Mallows model, but ask for an estimator that is provably robust, unlike the MLE. contribution 0.79 0.38 0.06 asserted 0.81
s4 Our main result is an efficiently computable estimator that achieves nearly optimal robustness guarantees. result 0.69 0.96 0.95 asserted 1.00
s5 In particular the robustness guarantees are dimension-independent in the sense that our overall accuracy does not depend on the number of alternatives being ranked. result 0.81 0.91 0.09 asserted 1.00
s6 As an immediate consequence, we show that while the landmark Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem tells us a strong impossiblity result about designing strategy-proof voting rules, there are quantitatively strong ways to protect against large coalitions if we assume that the remaining voters voters are honest and their preferences are sampled from a Mallows model. interpretation 0.77 0.87 0.19 asserted 0.99
s7 Our work also makes technical contributions to algorithmic robust statistics by designing new spectral filtering techniques that can exploit the intricate combinatorial dependencies in the Mallows model. contribution 0.98 0.95 0.03 asserted 1.00

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: method or tool 0.79 · evidence from proof or derivation 1.00.

What was examined, and what was not

sources read
  • arXiv listing abstract v2
not examined
  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
  • relations to other papers
levels run
  • P abstract
not run
  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. This means that a single voter or a group of colluding voters can vote strategically and drastically affect the outcome. Motivated by recent progress in algorithmic robust statistics, we revisit the fundamental problem of estimating the central ranking in a Mallows model, but ask for an estimator that is provably robust, unlike the MLE. Our main result is an efficiently computable estimator that achieves nearly optimal robustness guarantees. In particular the robustness guarantees are dimension-independent in the sense that our overall accuracy does not depend on the number of alternatives being ranked. As an immediate consequence, we show that while the landmark Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem tells us a strong impossiblity result about designing strategy-proof voting rules, there are quantitatively strong ways to protect against large coalitions if we assume that the remaining voters voters are honest and their preferences are sampled from a Mallows model. Our work also makes technical contributions to algorithmic robust statistics by designing new spectral filtering techniques that can exploit the intricate combinatorial dependencies in the Mallows model.

Human review
How the literature uses it

1 arXiv paper cite this in 1 sentence

Each citing sentence is taken from the citing paper's LaTeX source and typed by Pith's classifier. A label appears at probability 0.8 or more (0.95 for support), a contest at 0.7 or more; the quoted words are the citing authors'. How each label was checked · JSON

What it cites · 2 sentences without a confident label

Uses the method or tool of 1 paper
  • Then we iteratively refine the estimate $π$ by using stronger robust mean estimation algorithms [ref] that give us accuracy guarantees that depend on how well we know the covariance of the underlying distribution.

    Outlier Robust Mean Estimation with Subgaussian Rates via Stability · Spectral Filtering with Combinatorial Dependencies · 0.98

Cites as background 5 papers

Discussion

Know something about this paper? Leave a comment, or highlight any passage above to comment on it.