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Buying Opinions
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A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent can be induced to acquire and report honestly. When the agent is risk neutral, and a) is not asked to learn too much, b) can acquire information sufficiently cheaply, or c) can face sufficiently large penalties, the principal can attain the first-best outcome. We discuss the effect of risk aversion (on the part of the agent) and characterize the second-best contracts.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Moral Hazard in Delegated Bayesian Persuasion
In delegated Bayesian persuasion with moral hazard, first-best implementation requires local support and global affine alignment conditions on payoff indices; otherwise the second-best uses a virtual concavified objec...
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Incentivizing Information Acquisition
Identifies a sufficient and necessary condition on signal distributions ensuring optimal cutoff incentive contracts exist in a continuous-state information acquisition model.
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