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Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), Disintermediation and Financial Privacy: The Case of the Bahamian Sand Dollar

General Economics · Submitted 4 Apr 2022

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.

how it is stated · hedged possibility 0.58 read the record →

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arXiv ID2204.01535 (version 1)
Pith IDOJQ7RFPO, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationKilian Wenker. "Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), Disintermediation and Financial Privacy: The Case of the Bahamian Sand Dollar." arXiv:2204.01535 (2022). https://pith.science/paper/OJQ7RFPO
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The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 7,372 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.24 · states limitation 0.56 · human participants 0.04 · controlled comparison 0.21 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.04 · compares with prior results 0.43 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

The fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. I then develop a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the com-mercial banking sector. I argue that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. I identify the anonymity of CBDCs as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks, and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 The fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. background 1.00 0.05 0.02 asserted 0.53
s1 Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. gap 0.79 0.05 0.02 hedged possibility 0.99
s2 This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. contribution 1.00 0.79 0.03 asserted 0.99
s3 It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. contribution 0.52 0.77 0.02 asserted 0.81
s4 I then develop a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. method 0.90 0.92 0.02 asserted 0.88
s5 In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the com-mercial banking sector. result 0.76 0.68 0.14 asserted 1.00
s6 I argue that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. interpretation 0.69 0.78 0.47 asserted 0.57
s7 I identify the anonymity of CBDCs as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. result 0.85 0.81 0.06 asserted 0.77
s8 These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks, and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. interpretation 0.84 0.83 0.11 asserted 0.94
s9 I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC. interpretation 0.56 0.70 0.42 hedged possibility 0.58

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: position or commentary 0.99 · evidence from argument 1.00.

What was examined, and what was not

sources read
  • arXiv listing abstract v1
not examined
  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
  • relations to other papers
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  • P abstract
not run
  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

The fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. I then develop a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the com-mercial banking sector. I argue that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. I identify the anonymity of CBDCs as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks, and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.

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