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Learning Mixed Strategies in Trajectory Games

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arxiv 2205.00291 v2 pith:ZIVHGUPN submitted 2022-04-30 cs.GT cs.MAcs.SYeess.SY

classification cs.GTcs.MAcs.SYeess.SY
keywords gamegamestrajectorycompetitivemixedsettingsstrategiesagents
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In multi-agent settings, game theory is a natural framework for describing the strategic interactions of agents whose objectives depend upon one another's behavior. Trajectory games capture these complex effects by design. In competitive settings, this makes them a more faithful interaction model than traditional "predict then plan" approaches. However, current game-theoretic planning methods have important limitations. In this work, we propose two main contributions. First, we introduce an offline training phase which reduces the online computational burden of solving trajectory games. Second, we formulate a lifted game which allows players to optimize multiple candidate trajectories in unison and thereby construct more competitive "mixed" strategies. We validate our approach on a number of experiments using the pursuit-evasion game "tag."

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  1. Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information

    eess.SY 2025-01 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Best response dynamics in partially observed zero-sum linear quadratic games converge numerically after a few iterations, and low-order belief feedback strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium.

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