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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and General-Sum Bilinear Games

As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2208.03085.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2208.03085 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T10:31:55.394359Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-07T10:31:55.798559Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 674c6118-7ed3-4655-b6fb-d40c02b0d5bb · inbound

Asymmetric Perturbation in Solving Bilinear Saddle-Point Optimization cites this paper.

Asymmetric Perturbation in Solving Bilinear Saddle-Point Optimization Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and General-Sum Bilinear Games

Reference 15

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-07T10:31:55.810381Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-08T06:32:00.761636+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-07T10:31:55.394359Z digest=sha256:7b205deaefea666653f623e75c4f060a505f9798158ba2744d9539f923613c30

Observation 5ca3ca7e-20b0-4fdc-8396-703d7889e07f · inbound

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational cites this paper.

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and General-Sum Bilinear Games

Reference 16

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-04T09:40:00.344752Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-08-04T09:40:00.344752Z digest=sha256:b1ed4e5e7e7f40a032001634caa926badcb0c6d2b159f0cd8cd1d4c8c8284710