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Private Data Valuation and Fair Payment in Data Marketplaces

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arxiv 2210.08723 v3 pith:OG4TTBKC submitted 2022-10-17 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords datafairshapleyvalueperformancealgorithmdesignmarketplace
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Data valuation is an essential task in a data marketplace. It aims at fairly compensating data owners for their contribution. There is increasing recognition in the machine learning community that the Shapley value -- a foundational profit-sharing scheme in cooperative game theory -- has major potential to value data, because it uniquely satisfies basic properties for fair credit allocation and has been shown to be able to identify data sources that are useful or harmful to model performance. However, calculating the Shapley value requires accessing original data sources. It still remains an open question how to design a real-world data marketplace that takes advantage of the Shapley value-based data pricing while protecting privacy and allowing fair payments. In this paper, we propose the {\em first} prototype of a data marketplace that values data sources based on the Shapley value in a privacy-preserving manner and at the same time ensures fair payments. Our approach is enabled by a suite of innovations on both algorithm and system design. We firstly propose a Shapley value calculation algorithm that can be efficiently implemented via multiparty computation (MPC) circuits. The key idea is to learn a performance predictor that can directly predict model performance corresponding to an input dataset without performing actual training. We further optimize the MPC circuit design based on the structure of the performance predictor. We further incorporate fair payment into the MPC circuit to guarantee that the data that the buyer pays for is exactly the same as the one that has been valuated. Our experimental results show that the proposed new data valuation algorithm is as effective as the original expensive one. Furthermore, the customized MPC protocol is efficient and scalable.

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Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Efficient Decentralized Multi-task Dataset Valuation via Model Merging

    cs.CL 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Task-arithmetic model merging approximates multi-task coalition utilities well enough to recover Dataset Shapley rankings privately and without retraining.

  2. How Much Is a Dataset Worth? Scaling Laws, the Vendi Score, and Matrix Spectral Functions

    cs.LG 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 7.0 of 10

    Vendi Score and scaling-law objectives belong to the class of matrix spectral functions, which are submodular, enabling efficient greedy selection of training data that outperforms random subsets in predicting held-ou...

  3. A case for data valuation transparency via DValCards

    cs.LG 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Data valuation is unstable across imputation methods and can penalize minority groups; the paper proposes DValCards to document and constrain such valuation use.

  4. Semivalue-based data valuation is arbitrary and gameable

    cs.LG 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Semivalue-based data valuations are shown to be highly sensitive to plausible utility-function choices and are gameable under the paper's weak definition of gameability.

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