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Dishing Out DoS: How to Disable and Secure the Starlink User Terminal

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arxiv 2303.00582 v2 pith:DKMQJJFE submitted 2023-03-01 cs.CR cs.NI

classification cs.CRcs.NI
keywords userattackstarlinkattackersroutersatellitetargetterminal
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Satellite user terminals are a promising target for adversaries seeking to target satellite communication networks. Despite this, many protections commonly found in terrestrial routers are not present in some user terminals. As a case study we audit the attack surface presented by the Starlink router's admin interface, using fuzzing to uncover a denial of service attack on the Starlink user terminal. We explore the attack's impact, particularly in the cases of drive-by attackers, and attackers that are able to maintain a continuous presence on the network. Finally, we discuss wider implications, looking at lessons learned in terrestrial router security, and how to properly implement them in this new context.

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