REVIEW 2 cited by
Persuaded Search
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
abstract
We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information by buying signals from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals in any period, but high prices in the future discourage continued search by the agent, thereby reducing the principal's future profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists, and we show that the principal $(i)$ induces the socially efficient stopping rule, $(ii)$ extracts the full surplus, and $(iii)$ persuades the agent against settling for marginal goods, extending the duration of surplus extraction. However, introducing an additional, free source of information can lead to inefficiency in equilibrium.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
-
Value of History in Social Learning: Applications to Markets for History
The value of history is maximized by a mix of fully informative and uninformative private signals, and a data seller's optimal information design is less informative than the social optimum.
-
Information Aggregation and Social Networks: Responsiveness and Overturning
No network is uniformly optimal for information aggregation: under some signal distributions the star network uniquely maximizes the final agent's payoff, and under others the complete network does.
Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.