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Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts

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arxiv 2305.17655 v4 pith:PUMLIS36 submitted 2023-05-28 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords governancedecentralizedvotingdefianalyzingblockchaindaosholders
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a novel governance mechanism in blockchain ecosystems, particularly within Decentralized Finance (DeFi). By enabling token holders to propose and vote on protocol changes, these systems promise transparent and equitable decision-making without centralized control. In this paper, we present an in-depth empirical study of the governance protocols of Compound and Uniswap, two of the most widely used DAOs in DeFi. Analyzing over 370 governance proposals and millions of on-chain events from their inception until August 2024, we uncover significant centralization of voting power: as few as 3--5 voters were sufficient to sway the majority of proposals. We also find that the cost of voting disproportionately burdens smaller token holders, and that strategic voting behaviors, such as delayed participation and coalition formation, further distort governance outcomes. Our findings suggest that despite their decentralized ideals, current DAO governance mechanisms fall short in practice.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Voting Biases in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Governance

    cs.CY 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Author-selected Snapshot choices show a 58.8 pp higher voting-power share than non-author choices, exceeding approval (27.1 pp) and first-list (7.7 pp) associations.

  2. Democracy for DAOs: An Empirical Study of Decentralized Governance and Dynamic (Case Study Internet Computer SNS Ecosystem)

    cs.NI 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    SNS DAOs on the Internet Computer maintained or increased voter participation and approval over 20 months, averaging 64% participation and 96.8% approval across 14 DAOs.

  3. Rollback-Free Cross-Chain Atomicity Through Forward-Only Correction

    cs.CR 2026-07 reject novelty 3.0 of 10

    A design sketch proposes journal-and-compensate atomicity for cross-chain contracts, with no formal model, proofs, or prototype.

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