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You Can Run But You Can't Hide: Runtime Protection Against Malicious Package Updates For Node.js

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arxiv 2305.19760 v1 pith:QHJKS6IS submitted 2023-05-31 cs.CR cs.PL

classification cs.CRcs.PL
keywords maliciousruntimeattacksbeencapabilitiesdetectionlessmedian
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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Maliciously prepared software packages are an extensively leveraged weapon for software supply chain attacks. The detection of malicious packages is undoubtedly of high priority and many academic and commercial approaches have been developed. In the inevitable case of an attack, one needs resilience against malicious code. To this end, we present a runtime protection for Node.js that automatically limits a package's capabilities to an established minimum. The detection of required capabilities as well as their enforcement at runtime has been implemented and evaluated against known malicious attacks. Our approach was able to prevent 9/10 historic attacks with a median install-time overhead of less than 0.6 seconds and a median runtime overhead of less than 0.2 seconds.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. GoLeash: Mitigating Golang Software Supply Chain Attacks with Runtime Policy Enforcement

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    GoLeash enforces per-package capability policies in Go by attributing syscalls to packages via stack traces, achieving 98% detection of synthetic supply chain attacks.

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